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CHAPTER 1
DTTRODUCTION
The examination oforganized crime in the Commonwealth of Independent States
includes the challenge ofdefining the complexity of recent political and economic changes.
The Mafia is a major factor in Russia's attempted transition fi-om a centralized totalitarian
government into a democratic regime. This paper examines the Russian Mafia and how it
came to be a major influence on Russian politics. Evidence suggests the hegemony of the
Russian Mafia is a result of the informal economy and related corruption that was a
significant part ofthe political structure of the former Soviet Union.*
Economists usually have concluded that the informal economy improved efficiency
and consumer satisfaction. As aspects of this informal economy have developed into Mafia
actiwty, it has become less benign and is an open threat to the democratic transition in
Russia. It stifles competition and political interests that do not sustain criminal activity in
the former Soviet Union, and thus virtually eliminates the major benefit of a market
economy and democratic reforms.^
As one reviews the literature on Russian criminal activity, many writers seem to agree
that it is unlike the traditional stereotypes of the Mafia. The resulting explanations are more
general, intending to cover all organizations engaged in criminal activity, with the
* Edward P. Lazear, ed. Economic Transition in Eastern Europe andRussia: The Realities ofReform
(Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution Press, 1995), iv.
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assumption that Mafia organizations fall in this general category. This general category
includes groups with a division of labor, a hierarchical structure, and a distribution of the
profits of the crime. A gang that robs banks, however, is not a Mafia, nor is a terrorist
group, despite its use ofviolence. Neither organization nor violence associated with
criminal activity is sufficient to define aMafia.’
Albini furthers this argument in his famous work. The AmericanMafia, where he
declares the Mafia is not one organization; rather, the term is used to describe the modus
operandi ofan illicit organization that consists of the following criteria:
1. The use of force, intimidation or threats
2. The structure of a group whose purpose is that ofproviding
illicit services through the use of secrecy on the part of its
associates
3. The assurance ofpotential protection fi-om the legal structure
that is necessary for its continuous growth.'*
The term Mafia is more often associated with illegal enterprises, which are usually
ongoing enterprises in which arrangements and agreements that are not legal contracts are
made among participants. Extending beyond personal relationships, theMafia engages in
deals that are completed at meetings whose participants may need a larger structure to
enforce agreements among members ofthe group and outsiders and to punish violations.
Organizations able to enforce contracts and punish violators are also likely to decide which
agreements theywill enforce. These organizations may control the accessibility into a
^Ibid
^ Annelise G. Anderson, The RedMafia: A Legacy ofCommunism’, available from
http:/Avww.andrsn.stanford.edu/Otlier/i:edmaf.htni,.accessed 5 January 1998.
^
Joseph L Albini, TheAmericanMafia: A Genesisofa Legend (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofls,
1971), 155.
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Organizations able to enforce contracts and punish violators are also likely to decide which
agreements they will enforce. These organizations may control the accessibility into a
number ofcriminal activities and the behavior of those who seek their protection. Hence a
characteristic of the Mafia is that it performs governmental fimctions as law enforcement
agencies in spheres where the legal judicial system refuses to exercise power or is unable to
do so.* Another characteristic of the Mafia is their influence in law enforcement and
criminal justice systems. The Mafia may succeed in bribing individuals anywhere in the
criminal justice system and may agree in some cases to use its powers on behalfofothers
not generally under its protection.
When legitimate governmental authority becomes corrupted, the government may
lose, if it ever had, the power to protect citizens and legitimate businesses from crime. The
subversion of the criminal justice system allows theMafia to run, to receive compensation
fi-om, command access into, and mandate the operation of legitimate business enterprises.®
Under these circumstances the Mafia uses its influence in the criminal justice system to
perform activities comparable to the taxing and regulating powers of legitimate government.
The corruption of the government may extend beyond the criminal justice system to other
regulatory agencies or agencies that award contracts.’ AMafia in full operation, as in the
former Soviet Union, is fully capable ofcausing serious consequences for the economic
growth of the legitimate economy. They may create monopolies in local enterprises,
control entry and maximize revenue by extracting monopoly profits as protection payments




or kripha.* New investments may be discouraged and old investments driven out; investors
are likely to invest in areas that are less treacherous.
TheMafia in Russia
Unlike the American and the SicilianMafia, in Russia there is not a central
commander or “don” that controls everything and no hierarchical structure or family
dynasties. The criminal syndicates are different because organized crime in Russia is highly
diverse and fi-actured with ethnic divisions; rank based on authority and intergenerational
separations are all present in Russian criminal syndicates.^ The American and Sicilian
Mafiosi admit members, fi’atemize with them, enforce the oath of defiance against national
authority, and deliver the benefits oftheir influence over the criminal justice system. They
may control entry into illegal and legal markets as well. But those organizations are not
themselves the sole groups that assume the economic responsibilities of the criminal
enterprise.^® The revenue-generating businesses operated by the members of the group are
undertaken by enterprises more transitory than the group itselfand often involve outsiders.
The economic structure is not the same as the governing structure. For some illegal
markets the organization may function like a cartel, a fi'anchiser, or a trade association with
the significant difference that it does not leave the monopoly ofviolence to the state.
* DavidHoffinan, “Banditry Threatens the New Russia,” The Washington Post, 12 May 1997,1 (A).
® Phil Williams, “Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime,” inRussian Organized
Crime: A New Threat, ed. Phil Williams (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 12.
‘°Ibid.
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Major Conditions Associated with the Development and Origin of theMafia
Historically, three major conditions are associated with the origins and development of the
Mafia: an abdication of legitimate government power, possibly encouraged by the
population's rejection ofgovernment authority; excessive bureaucratic power; and the
financial potential of illegal markets. Two of the three conditions related to the
development and growth of the Mafia, excessive bureaucratic power and illegal markets,
were characteristic of the Soviet Union before its breakup at the end of 1991. The literature
on the underground economy in the Soviet Union illustrates that;
1. A substantial underground economy that was not “off the books”
ofthe state owned enterprises operating in association with legal
or planned economy. This was in addition to legal private
enterprise, such as the private agricultural plot.
2. Bribery and extortion were systematic features ofeconomic
transitions throughout the economy. From retail outlets to large
manufacturing enterprises to medical care and education, bribery
was the standard in both state-operated enterprises and private
business, both for private gain and to achieve the goals of the
state.
3. The Communist party monitored and controlled other bureaucrats
and all aspects ofeconomic activity at all levels.
4. Those in positions ofauthority had knowledge of the
underground economy and the bribery and extortion. Selective
enforcement of the variety of laws, rules, governing conduct, and
selective use ofother powers enabled the authorities to control or
manipulate underground economic activity for their own political
purposes.”
An example ofthis phenomena is found in Joseph Berliner’s study ofmanagement
methods and factory operations in the USSR between 1938 and 1957. He demonstrated
that, even for factory managers whose goals were compatible with the incentive structure of
” Anderson, The RedMafia, 6.
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a centralized economy, “Only by engaging in irregular practices can the manager run a
successful enterprise.”*^ To meet quotas when there were constant shortages, many factory
managers resorted to using their influence for a variety ofpmposes. The factory position of
tolkach developed to obtain scarce commodities through a combination of influence and
gifts. In return, the factory manager provides supplies or services to others through
several illegal methods, such as labeling good products as rejects. In the mid-1970s a
number of studies demonstrated that the irregular economic activity in the USSR went
beyond state-sanctioned goals and rewards. In a 1977 article, Gregory Grossman described
the major forms of illegal economic activity in the Soviet Union. He explained how stealing
from nationalized cooperatives was practiced “by virtually everyone,” providing extra
income to employees and, “An important, often indispensable, basis for the second
economy.”*^ Grossman cites peasants stealing fodder, workers stealing tools and materials,
physicians stealing medicines, drivers stealing gasoline, truck drivers diverting freight, and
managers redirecting goods either to the black market or into barter channels for needed
supplies.*®
In the Soviet, economy shortages of consumer and producer goods provided the
opportunity for additional incomes at all stages in the process ofexchange. Goods arriving
at stores were often set aside for customers who paid extra to employees. Those who
Joseph S Berliner, “ The Informal Organization of the Small Firm,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 3, no. 3 (August 1952): 324.
Ibid., 324.




controlled the distribution of needed commodities were often in a position to receive
additional compensation from consumers. Speculation in a variety ofgoods was another
form of illegal economic activity. Gifts or bribes accompanied all this illegal market activity
to “highly placed authorities, ranging up to ... local government chiefs ... higher party
secretaries and first secretaries.”^® Reporting the sale of a variety ofofficial’s positions for
relatively large sums ofmoney, Grossman finds the process ofbribery and embezzlement
was institutionalized. He states that:
. . . there is a close connection between political administrative
authority, on the one hand, and a highly developed world of illegal
economic activity on the other. In sum the concept ofkleptocracy...
does not seem inapplicable. Illegal private economic activities are a
major and extremely widespread phenomenon that for a very large part
of the population is, in one form or another, a regular, almost daily,
experience.**
Konstantin Simis, likewise, described the Soviet Union as being a "corrupt society"
and believed both the state and society were infused with corruption on all levels.*® He
theorizes that organized crime in the Soviet Union expanded during the Brezhnev regime.
Simis’ argument about the time in question is invaluable due to his career as a Russian
lawyer who defended a number ofunderground businessmen and the Russian Mafia in the
1950s and 1960s. He considers bribery and corruption fundamental to the nature ofthe
Soviet regime that:
Those involved in the corruption include secretaries and heads of





Konstantin Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 174.
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KGB and militia commanders, the chairmen ofdistrict executive
councils, their deputies and departments heads, as well as the heads of
district inspectorates and, in districts not forming part ofa large town
or city, the district prosecutors.^
In general, many of the senior staffmembers provide protection for the very same
directors who are engaged in criminal activity; therefore, any attempt to combat such
organized crime is doomed to be unsuccessful. Even when the criminal activities ofa local
Mafia are reported to higher authority, there is almost no attempt to press charges against
them, and the Mafia then has a chance to turn on those who tried to have their crimes
exposed.^' Simis converses at length about defending people involved in the underground
economy in the Soviet Union, several ofwhich involve people who reported criminal
activity and corruption to the authorities and, as a result, were forced to leave town or were
jailed. Thus, the extensive rules and regulations were selectively enforced to meet the
objectives of those in power.^ As a junior Soviet official said, "The government knows
exactly who is dealing in what, arrests are made only when there is some larger political
reason."^
By contrast, the underground economy had arbitrators who had a reputation for
fairness and impartially heard disputes. The parties to the dispute agreed to be bound by the
results, with which they usually complied. Cheating and deceit were dealt with by ostracism
^ Ibid, 35-36.
Ibid, 38.
“ Konstantin Simis, “The Machinery ofCorruption in the Soviet Union,”A Journal ofEast and West
Studies 23, no. 4 (Autunm 1977-78): 68-72.
^ Dennis O’Heam, “The Consumer Second Economy: Size and Effects,” Soviet Studies 32, no. 2 (April
1980): 219.
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from a community that previously embraced them; as a result almost everyone complied
with their judgments.
Simis likewise reports that since the 1950s private enterprise often has been entered
by buying a business that was operating within a state-owned enterprise. The purchaser
acquired the right to the equipment and labor the previous owner had used "off the books,"
as well as the previous owner's connections within the state-owned enterprise and with
outsiders.^** A report by Peter Boetthe and Gary M. Anderson provides an overview of
legal and illegal private economic activity in the Soviet Union. Both authors recount a
variety of instances ofbribe taking and of the sale of important positions, which were
isolated instances but endemic to the Soviet system. Protection from legal sanctions and
regulations was a profitable source of revenue for many oflBcials.^
Boettke and Anderson interpret the Soviet economic system as a form of
mercantilism where the central government sells positions where individuals are able to bilk
tax-paying citizens as a means of raising revenue.“ The function of the central plan was,
"To protect the value ofmercantilism monopoly rights" and was thus an essential tool for
controlling competition within and among cartels.^’ The communist party was the
preeminent organization, which determined prominent appointments and managed
corporations.
Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society, 159.
Peter J. Boettke and GaryM. Anderson, “Socialist Venality: A Rent-SeekingModel of the Mature
Soviet-Style Economy” (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Working Papers, 1992), 6.
^Ibid.
27 Ibid, 5, 30.
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Economists Hillman and Schnytzer apply the concept of rent seeking or taking bribes
to the information provided by Simis, Grossman and others, noting that, "The evidence
reveals the illegal economy is not marginal to the oflBcial and officially sanctioned
systems."^* They note that ifofficials did not receive the rents, then their unemployment
would not only mean a loss of income, both legal and illegal, but also a loss of special
privileges. Like Boettke and Anderson, they find that the profit associated with corruption
provides an obstacle for reform;
To the extent that a centrally planned economy generates rents ... it is
rational for individuals to engage in rent seeking and, consequently,
rent-protecting activity. The uncertainties of the market remain, while
the bureaucratization of society and the illegality ofmost market
operations give rise to a plethora of rents.^
In the Gorbachev era two pieces of legislation, the Law on Individual Labor Activity,
which went into effect in May 1987, and the Law on Cooperatives of 1988, significantly
affected the underground economy. These laws legalized private businesses, with a variety
of restrictions, and by January 1,1990, about 200,000 cooperatives became legitimate
corporations.^*^ Some cooperatives were former underground enterprises that became legal;
others, according to Jones and Moskoff’s book on the cooperatives of the Gorbachev era,
were utilized for money laundering. Some were new business ventures, but the majority
were created within state-owned enterprises, often by the managers. Like then-
underground predecessors and the state-owned enterprises, they had supply problems and
^ A.L. Hillman and A. Schnytzer, “Illegal Economic Activities and Purges in a Soviet-Type Economy: A
Rent-Seeking Perspective,” InternationalReview ofLaw andEconomics 6, no.l (June 1986): 88.
^ Boettke and Anderson, “Socialist Venality,” 97.
^ Anthony Jones andWilliam Maskoff, Ko-ops:The Rebirth o/Entrep-eneurship in the Soviet Union
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 16-17.
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used unsavory sources and methods of obtaining supplies. They also found bribery essential
to survival.^ ^
The cooperatives were penalized for high prices and their desire to make a profit,
which conflicted with the Bolshevik ideology. The government continually changed the
rules for cooperatives, charging them with crimes, while at the same time failing to protect
the cooperatives fi’om criminal activity. The cooperatives responded by paying protection
and establishing their own protection services.^^ The failure ofpolice to protect legitimate
private businesses was a key problem, one that began in the Gorbachev era. The new
cooperatives had no alternative but to comply with gangs running protection rackets.
Jones and Moskoflf also assert that violence against cooperatives during the Gorbachev era
was "occasional,” but threats may have been more common. In the words of former
Russian police official YuriMzum:
When cooperatives were permitted in the mid-80s ... authorities saw
no need to provide them with any special protection. We were all
taught to regard private property as somehow illegitimate anyway. The
police stayed away from these businesses like the plague and offered
them no help, so of course when black marketers threatened them, they
had no alternative but to go along. Now, it's too late.^"*
Apathy concerning the well-being ofcooperative owner’s led them to see the
assistance ofblack marketers in the absence ofgovernment support. The need for an
Ibid., 36-38; 78-85.
Ibid., 85-86.




adequate rule of law in Russia allows many to mistakenly insist that criminal activity aids in
the formation of a capitalist economy.
Organized Crime as an Early Stage ofCapitalism
A number ofeconomists argue that crime in Russia, especially organized crime, is
simply an "early stage" of capitalism, implying that conditions in Russia today are like those
in some earlier era in the United States, perhaps the era ofthe old West. "Some Russians
argue," Handelman says, "That a period of lawlessness is part of the price every society
pays for radical economic change.^^ Pointing to examples as diverse as the development of
the AmericanWest and the transformation ofLatin American economies, they suggest that
without a certain amount ofcriminal activity in private firms, the consumer goods in most
Russian cities would disappear."^®
"Russia right now is a bit like America west ofDodge City in the mid-1800s,"
according to George Melloan.^’ "Today’s corruption" writes Michael Scammell, a professor
ofRussian literature, "Seems to be characteristic ofa period ofprofound change and
upheaval, when Russian society is in the stage (to paraphraseMarx) of the primitive
accumulation of capital.^*
But the peculiarities ofeconomic life in Russia have little similarity to conditions in
the 19“* century United States. An important characteristic of the United States fi'om its
Ibid., 50.
^Ibid.
George Melloan, “Steering Clear ofRussia’s Mafias,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 March 1992, 9 (A).
^ Michael Scammel, “What’s Good for the Mafia is Good for Russia,” The New York Times, 26
December 1993, 12 (A).
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formation was a respect for the rule of law. "For eighteenth-century Americans, liberty
demanded the rule of law,” writes historian Pauline Maier.^® Furthermore, property law and
contract law had been developing in Great Britain for centuries, and the legal system ofthe
United States drew heavily from British common law.'*® Unlike the early United States,
Russia does not have a tradition ofcommon law or the respect ofdemocratic principles
entrenched in the Western world.
Any relationship between the North American and Russian capitalist transition is
confounded by the fact that until the Second WorldWar, the United States government
expenditures were small in relation to the size of the economy; and regulatory controls were
minor, so that whatever the level ofcorruption, its effect on the economy was relatively
limited.
The early United States differs from modem Russia in a number ofother important
ways. The early banking system in the United States had its problems but they were
privately owned and served the interests of the state. In Russia, by contrast, few banks are
tmly privately owned. Most are partially or entirely owned by state-owned corporations,
the central bank or ministries, with powers left over from their role in the communist era.^'
Other sources of financing developed in the United States, as well, and the dependence of
business on government as a source of income was small.
Pauline Maier, “Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth - Century America,” inAmerican
Law and the ConstitutionalOrder: HistoricalPerspectives, ed. Lawrence M. Friedman and Harry N.
Scheiber (Massachusetts: HarvardUniversity Press, 1978), 67.
'"Ibid.
John T. Noonan, Bribes (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984), 14.
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In addition, the 19* century United States had a moderate bureaucracy, few
regulations, a weak central government, capital inflows rather than capital flight, and
minimal taxation/^ These facts contradict the necessary conditions that are associated with
the origins and development of the Mafia in Russia, i.e., excessive bureaucratic power and a
tightly controlled economy that encouraged illegal markets and trafficking prohibited goods.
There is limited support for the belief that fi’aud, violence, and the development of the
Mafia in Russia is simply the result ofearly stage of capitalism. The RussianMafia has no
corresponding organization in the early history of the United States and has arisen instead
from the legacy of Soviet communism, including excessive bureaucratic regulation, massive
illegal markets, and the demise of the communist party which allowed a vacuum ofpower
that was not filled by the national govemment.^^ Robert Kaplan furthered this argument in
his article. The ComingAnarchy, where he hypothesizes that as established governments
become ineffective, the real powerwill fall into the hands ofgangs allied by common
interests.
That, according to two North American economists, Stergios Skaperdas and
Constantinos Syropoulos, provides a conceptual model ofhow gangs, which they interpret
as primitive states, develop in situations ofanarchy. They define gangs as permanent
organizations involved primarily in economic activity and having a near-monopoly of
violence in a defined territory and a cooperative relationship with the authorities. "Gangs
Carolyn Webber and Aaron Wildavsky, A History ofTaxation andExpenditure in the
Western World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 342.
Anderson, RedMafia, 15.
^ Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric ofour Planet,” TheAtlanticMonthly, February 1994,47.
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emerge," they say, "Out ofsituations in which there is a power vacuum that the State is
unable to In the Skaperdas-Syropoulos model, primitive states arise not out ofjoint
action but out ofduress. The initial resources are significant in determining which people
become the leaders, that:
... the agents with the comparative advantage in unproductive
activities and a greater number of resources become the rulers of the
anarchic territory or, in another interpretation, those agents have higher
rank within the organization emerging out ofanarchy.
In the resulting primitive state, people are more efficient at producing consumer goods and
will seek to migrate to less arbitrary and coercive states.
It is the author’s interpretation that these conditions are not an early stage of
capitalism but an early stage oforganized crime. Organized crime in Russia appears to be
persistent, more than likely because agencies that control law enforcement are themselves
beneficiaries ofthe underworld through benefits provided byMafia organizations.
Consequently, where politicians are unwilling to support any conclusive strategy against the
Mafia, law enforcement agencies will continue to be unable to counter threats to their own
people or other government officials.
This thesis is written to include a new perspective on the nature ofdemocratic
transitions and the importance ofgovernments to rule. When the state loses its right as a
sovereign authority, as an institution, as a symbol of identity, this right to rule also
disappears. In Russia this right to rule is lost when many ofthe functions that are
traditionally attributed to nation-states are lost to gangsters. All too ofl:en, this is the
Stergios Skaperdas and Constantines, “Gangs as Primitive States,” in Economics ofOrganized Crime,
ed. Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peitzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4-5.
46 Ibid, 15.
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dilemma faced by many developing nations. Beyond the collapse of the Soviet Union,
indeed, the more difficult and politically challenging task is rebuilding a viable national
government. As is often the case, this reconstruction is fiirther threatened when the central
authority is beset with internal pressures and corrupt leaders, many ofwhich were not only
part of the initial collapse but endangers the fiature ofdemocracy in Russia.
This thesis will explain the role of the Mafia and corruption in the government in
circumventing democratic reform in Russia. The questions posed here are the following;
Does the Mafia and related corruption exist in Russia? Do they pose a problem? If so, how
serious a problem? What are the unique historical and political causes for that
phenomenon? What is the significance of the vory v zakone (the leaders ofthe Russian
Mafia) on tlie growth of illegal activity in the former Soviet Union? Was Communism
heavily influenced by the vory v zakone and other criminal groups during the first Russian
Revolution? Does Russia fit the model of a consolidated democracy, unconsolidated
democracy, or is it still largely a totalitarian regime influenced by the Russian Mafia?
In Russia when the old order collapsed, the deep but regulated corruption of the
former Soviet government gave way to the cancerous growth of crime that is consuming the
nation. The explosion of crime and corruption in Russia threatens the fledgling democracy.
Threats to personal security and property, widespread prostitution, worsening drug
trafficking, and unbridled theft in the government increases the appeal of a return to
communism or a new ultranationalist regime.**’ Future governments could use the rise in
crime and corruption as an excuse to weaken the private sector and reverse any attempts at
democratic consolidation.
Ariel Cohen, “Crime without Punishment,” Journal ofDemocracy 6, no. 1 (April 1995): 36.
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The fundamental question is whether Russia can become a stable democracy in the
future in the face ofMafia influence. I will first explore the cultural and historical role of
organized crime and define the current status of such organizations. Next, the unique
conditions in Russia that gave corrupt officials and organized crime groups ample
opportunities to infiltrate and exploit the weaknesses of the nation will be explained. The
thesis concludes with an assessment ofthe best and worst case scenarios of the future of
democracy in a Russia faced with the challenge of organized crime.
CHAPTER!
THE HISTORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME
The level of infiltration of crime in Russian private and public institutions is
unparalleled. On 26 January 1994, Izvestia reported that the Russian Mafia now controls
70 to 80 percent ofall private business and banking.^ Most importantly, the Russian
Mafia poses a major impediment for healthy economic improvement. TheMafia is
economically debilitating; it is often a type ofgrowth not consistent with mending a weak
economy. Too much money and national attention is devoted to security and protection
and not enough on improving the conditions of the average Russian citizen.
The development of aMafia also illuminates the problems of trying to reconstruct a
civilization that has been subjected to centuries of oppressive rule. This situation has left a
political vacuum the Russian Mafia abruptly used to control new political establishments
and the economy. In spite ofthe fact that crime and degradation has always existed in
Russia, the magnitude of criminal activity has increased dramatically since the last Russian
revolution in 1991.^ Conversely, the Mafia in Russia today manipulates and influences
traditional criminal enterprises as well as much ofthe ordinary activity.
* Marshall I. Goldman, “Why is theMafia so Dominant in Russia?” ChallengeMagazine, January -
February 1996, 39; Howard Witt, “ForRussian’s, Mafia is Part ofEveryday Life,” Chicago Tribune, 24
Novemter 1996,1 (A); and Claire Sterling, Thiefs World: The Threat ofthe Global Network of
Organized Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 87.
^ Ibid., 39 and Armelise Anderson, The RedMafia: A Legacy ofCommunism,
http://andm.stanford.edu/Other/redmafhtm, accessed 5 January 1998,1.
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The Beginning of Criminal Syndicates
The actual date of the inception ofthe Russian Mafia is generally unknown.
However, each author has given an estimate about the time in which roaming bands of
thugs became organized criminals. Claire Sterling, in her novel. Thieves World: The
Threat of the GlobalNetwork ofOrganized Crime, states that these brotherhoods date
back to the 1600s. Sterling notes that the specialization ofcriminal activity was evident
especially during the reign ofPeter the Great when the countryside was overflowing with
thieves.^ In the outlying areas ofMoscow there were more than 30,000 thieves, although
the level of their “criminal organization” is unknown because they lived apart and ran
separate, isolated gangs. Because of the vague nature of their “organization,” Albini,
Rogers, Shabalin, and Kutushev cite the origins of the RussianMafia as much later.^
They argue that these affiliations emphasized secrecy, were organized, had a leader, were
established to steal and extort money, but they were not technically members of the
Mafia. From this information and the minimal amount ofdata that exists regarding them,
particularly during the formation of the Secret Security Police and later the repressive
nature ofgovernment under Stalin, the authors hypothesized that criminal syndicates
engaged in mercenary not syndicated crime.
The Final, and possibly the most plausible argument concerning the beginning of
syndicated crime in Russia was made by Patricia Rawlinson, who theorizes that the
inefficiency ofSoviet totalitarianism led to a political and social culture that is inundated
by crime. She states that during the IS**" century, criminal organizations began to use
’
Joseph Serio, “Threats to the Foreign Business Community in Moscow,” in Russian Organized Crime:
A New Threat?” ed. Phil Williams (Portland: Frank CJass Publishers, 1997), 92.
* Anderson, The RedMafia, 8.
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financial contributions as a means of securing membership while, concurrently, the use of
secret codes and nicknames among the criminals came into greater practice.’
Since the beginning of the 19* century, Russia remained a feudal nation; it did not
have a legislature, a free market, and the notion of representative institutions was
unfamiliar to the Russian aristocracy. Even an attempted coup to force increased popular
representation, known as the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, helped to intensify the
oppression by increasing censorship and led to the creation ofthe ThirdSection, an early
version of the KGB.** Some improvement after the revolt was signified by the
Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 and the Judicial Reforms of 1864, which created the
first open hearings, and the election ofjudges for criminal cases.’ However, amendments
to the constitution proved to be elusive. The Czar’s response to this insurrection led to
the revolutionary movement that ultimately exchanged one autocratic government with
another one.
The lack of respect Russian leaders had for legitimate structures is applicable to the
maturation ofa consciousness that is conducive for inept bureaucratic structures,
particularly in the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system did not impart a
reputable degree of impartiality in an environment ofcorruption that was motivated by a
lack of tenure and discretionary policy-making, all ofwhich are the consequences of
authoritarian rule.
Law in Russia soon became viewed as an instrument of the rich at the expens^of
the poor. Illegal activity became a means of compensation for the inequality the peasants
faced in even the best oftimes. The peasants used criminal movements as a “necessary
evil” were more likely to resort to this activity as bureaucrats. The lack ofexperienced
* Patricia Rawlinson, “Russian Organized Crime; A BriefHistory,” in Russian Organized Crime: A




bureaucrats, where advancement was grounded more on appeasement than actual skill,
aided in petty corruption and ignorance of the bureaucratic process that encouraged
future felonious activity. As a result the judicial system was too corrupt to uphold justice,
while the executive branch was too dependent on the czar to promote effective change.
In some ways, the criminal network represents the consummation of conventional
revolutionary schemes. Walter Laquer in a study on terrorism observes, "In some of the
nineteenth century secret societies ofEastern Europe, such as the 'League of the Just,'
which later became the Communist League, the 'doctrine ofterror' was the mobilization ofoutlaws.* Wilhelm Weitting, a leader of the League, discussed various means of
“founding the kingdom ofheaven by unleashing hell," one ofwhich would be "to turn
loose the 'thieving proletariat' on society.”^Weitting thought he could mobilize at least
20,000 smart and courageous murderers and thieves.
According to the League, the alliance between the revolutionary leaders and the
gangster underworld was to reappear from time to time in the 19*** century terrorist
movements; it was not until the advent of the Bolshevik state in Soviet Russia in 1917
that this alliance was fully realized.Unlawful enterprises were commonly viewed as
advocates of the poor and oppressed by the peasant class. In the final years ofczarist
governance, criminal groups became the symbols ofpolitical defiance. Nineteenth century
anarchist Mikhal Bakunin explained that in Russia:
The brigand is the only true revolutionary; he is a revolutionary without
phrases, without bookish rhetoric ... the brigands confined in the
innumerable prisons of the empire - these constitute a single,
indivisible, tight-knit world, the world of the Russian revolution. In
this world and in it alone, there has always been revolutionary





conspiracy. Anyone in Russia who seriously wants to conspire, anyone
who wants a “people's revolution," must go into this world."
The future heirs to the Russian government also engaged in criminal activity.
Lawlessness was used to raise needed funds for the revolution; their criminal activity was
well organized, and they encouraged the formation ofalliances with members of the
criminal underworld. Vladimir Illich Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviks, sanctioned this
organization. Armed robberies were carried out to raise needed funds for the illegal
communist party. Stalin, likewise, was so enamored as a child by the chronicles of a
Caucasian outlaw who defended the poor that he adopted the name Koba for his first heist
at the Tiflis post office."
The Bolshevik’s own experience with robbery alerted them to the dangers it can
impose. The Bolsheviks knew the tactics, strengths, and methods ofarmed resistance,
and with this knowledge they attempted to terminate any counter-revolutionary
movement after they were in power. The post-revolutionary wave of criminal activity
involved the very people, which the Bolsheviks would have targeted for robbery.
Dispossessed factory owners, Menshevik sympathizers, intellectuals, and the aristocracy
who opposed the new rule resorted to the same style ofdisobedience. Ironically, the
members of this new resistance movement were accused ofcollaborating with foreign
sympathizers and ofmanaging operations in France - many of the same crimes Lenin and
the Bolshevik party were guilty ofearlier." Bolshevik leaders obtained lessons beyond
mere criminal aptitude; the gangs' stringent regulations and surreptitious existence, along
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with their contempt of conventional culture, became attributes of the communist party.
The previous affiliation between the communist leaders and criminal organizations raises
the question ofwhether Soviet communism owes more of its existence to Marxism or
gangsterism. Unfortunately for the brigand groups that collaborated with the Bolsheviks,
the mutual respect they experienced did not last beyond the revolution. The delinquents
were not willing to submit to communist rhetoric or laws and became as resistant to the
communists as they were to the monarchy.
The eventual communist revolution and subsequent Bolshevik rule were both by¬
products ofCzarist Russia. Beyond the chaos that usually accompanies rebellions, the
birth of the new regime was inextricably marred by an autocratic mentality that sought to
prevail over all legitimate government agencies.*’ The legislature became more abused
and manipulated than ever. In terms ofeconomics, Russia's most pressing dilemma, the
government found itselfembracing awkward concessions fi’om Stalin's New Economic
Policy right up to Perestroika. Therefore, the dishonesty and deception that ruined the
Czarist Empire eventually became the basis for the shaky foundation ofthe emerging
socialist republic. Russia's economic failures meant political failure.** Economic
problems soon created chronic shortages that the average citizen overcame by supporting
a shadow economy. It was this black market that became one of the predecessors of
organized crime in the Soviet Union.
In regard to the systematic criminal activity in Russia during the communist era,
formally the Soviet leaders asserted that such activity only occurred in capitalist nations.*’
Consequently, the military and the KGB suppressed any data concerning any indication of
George Leggett, The Checka: Lenin’sPolitical Choice (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1981),
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criminal activity. But it should be noted that a majority of crime during the 1930s was a
result ofStalin's purges, therefore politically motivated and not organized crime.^® Hence,
the current assumption that syndicated crime did not occur in the Soviet Union is
erroneous. Lydia Rosner agrees that organized crime was merely hidden from view until
the fall of communism.^' Contemporary organized crime began emerging and growing in
complexity by the 1950s and prospering during the Brezhnev administration from 1964 to
1982. It was during this era that a growing portion ofthe gross national product was
allocated to military expenditures at the expense of the So^det standard of living, forcing
even the most honest people to support the shadow economy, therefore strengthening
criminal syndicates.
Thieves Professing the Code: The Leaders of the Russian Mafia
The vary or thieves professing a code (its literal translation in English) is a
distinctive organization that does not have any similarities anywhere else in the world.
The vory is wholly a product of the unique realities of life in Russia. The inception of
criminal organizations in the Soviet Union was seen in the brigand bands ofpeasants in
the 1?“* century. In this society, where the monarchy owned all the land and the people
who resided on this land, political defiance and criminal behavior were almost
interchangeable. Bandits who pilfered government officials were venerated for sabotaging
the supremacy of the Czar’s bureaucrats.^ Occasional pillaging often turned into
established rebellions. These uprisings frequently brought criminal elements together
where they incorporated the traditional communal structure of the peasant’s society.
Earnings were divided proportionally among their constituents, and the vory v zakone^ or
“Ibid.
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the thiefof the highest authority, was often a more experienced criminal who tested the
newest members.^
Later the Russian mobsters began to draft a complicated body of regulations and
customs to differentiate themselves from other criminal societies. The societies of
beggars' and thieves' in 19“' century Russia were the prototype of the modem Russian
mob, though which one can study the mles ofconduct that govern such behavior. For
instance, leaving the group was deemed to be the worst offense a vory could commit
among the thieves. The beggar's societies punished defectors by slicing their wallets as a
symbol of returning them to the outside world and destroying their livelihood.^
A number of syndicates in Russia employed extravagant methods ofexpressing
their loyalty. In the 17* century some highway bandits murdered their families before
they went on a major raid to prohibit any adversaries from taking them. Other gangs
utilized more humane means of solidifying their criminal bond by encouraging members to
marry women involved in illegal activities, either by blood or by profession.“ Thus,
children bora in these unions have helped to keep the traditions of these fringe groups
alive.
Although there were numerous ways ofendearing oneself to the organization, the
ultimate means was to separate from society. Prior to the revolution, members ofthe
vory would cover themselves with tattoos, slice a wrist, or even cut off a finger in
opposition to the larger society. The most distinguishing characteristic the vory employed
was to go to prison. Unlike other industrial nations, jail time signified perpetual ostracism
and exclusion from the privileges ofcommunist citizenship. Jail time, however, accounted
for the continuity ofgangland traditions and customs, which led to the birth of certain
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codes of conduct among criminals. The resulting criminal codes eventually joined
together to create the foundation ofmodem crime syndicates in Russia.
The forerunner of the modem very v zakone came into existence as a means of
political criminals uniting with traditional criminals to escape the despotic Soviet prison
system. Nevertheless, it was impossible to unite the political and criminal element without
a degree ofassimilation ofthe former into the latter. As a result, many ofthe political
criminals took the name zhigemi?^ Zhigani borrowed the traditions of the underworld
and altered them to fit the ideological undertones that were unique to the political
criminals. Their “code” allowed them to distance themselves somewhat fi’om the
traditional criminals. As the theoretical antithesis to the communist regime, the zhigani
acquired these regulations; here are a few of them:
1. Forbidden to have a family and must turn their back on their mother,
father, brothers and sisters; the criminal family is their family.
2. Forbidden to go to war for the state.
3. Forbidden to cooperate with authorities as a witness or a victim.
4. Obligated to donate money for the good of society.
5. They must give moral and material assistance to other thieves.
6. They must never give information about accomplices and their
whereabouts to any one other than a thief
7. If a thief is under investigation, a petty thiefmust take the
responsibility upon himself to give the suspected thief time to flee.
8. When a conflict arises in a criminal group or among thieves, there
must be a meeting or skhodka to resolve the issue.
9. Punishment for a thief is decided by the meeting and must be carried out.
“ S.I. l£oedev.Antisocial Traditions, Customs and their Influence on Crime (Moscow: Militia Higher
School, 1989), 56.
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10. A thiefmust be fluent in the criminal jargon orfenia.
11. A thiefmust fulfill all promises to other thieves.^
Nevertheless, problems began to plague this new method oforganized crime, as
criminals with different philosophical perspectives were not able to unite internally. As a
result, toward the end of the 1920s and 1930s, a leadership crisis unfolded. The rank and
file members of the hierarchy began to disregard the zhigani and promote their own
figureheads, the urki?^ Constant bickering between the zhigani and the urki produced the
need to perfect the code ofthe underworld, by which the senior members of the criminal
world accepted a uniform regulation oftheir activities.
Correctional facilities once again became the perfect medium for the quick
circulation of the thieves' traditions and codes. Many prison inhabitants were the victims
ofStalin's wrath on "deviant activity." The subsequent crackdown became yet another
phase that encouraged the formation ofcriminal syndicates. Prisons and labor camps
filled with dissenters soon became a society within the larger society. Life inside these
labor camps encouraged the organization ofderelicts loyal to one another and, in a tightly
regulated power structure, ready to assist in any future criminal endeavors.^ In prison an
individual’s cunning and experience determined their survival. The honor accorded to
them by other inmates also was recognized by prison employees who used the hardened
“ Serio, “Threats to the Foreign Business,” 89.
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in the Soviet penitentiaries used the "war" to methodically eliminate certain prisoners.
Warring factions were purposely placed in the same compounds and often allowed to
murder one another. The death rate became so great the prisoners were forced to modify
the code to survive. After much debate and compromise the vary settled on an exemption
that allowed the right, in case ofextreme need, to cooperate with authorities.
In the 1950s, a number ofvary began to gravitate away fi’om their regulations and
customs. Wardens and other prison persoimel attempted to eventually undermine the
criminals and viewed this insurrection in a positive light. Using the approval of the prison
hierarchy, these criminal elite began to establish their own command. They, like the vory
before them, set down rules governing their behavior and labeled themselves as the
champions ofgangster morality and traditions. Furthermore, the prison casualties after
the suchya ’voina left a vacancy that was filled by newly convicted delinquents who were
often orphaned or homeless children who turned to crime to survive. These new criminals
did not profess a code ofhonor and sought out to challenge the traditional authority.
At the same time, the "scabs" distanced themselves fi"om the traditional criminal
establishment when they were released from the gulags. Having already been ostracized
for violating a major code, they felt little need to follow the other rules, especially the
tenets against going into business and trade.^® By the 1980s, some of the most successful
tsekhovik, or owners ofunderground factories, were the disgraced members ofthe vory
and their associates. They even initiated alliances outside the underground with business
owners and communist party leaders. The modem crime boss challenged the hegemony
Rawlinson, “Russian Organized Crime,” 41.
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of the traditional vory. Because this godfather had less regard for the antiquated rules of
the vory, he was less apt to follow their strict moral codes.
The new crime boss, called the avtoritet or authority, radically altered the Soviet
underworld.^^ The avtoritet had loftier goals than the old-style vory who viewed too
much wealth as capitalist excess. This crime boss also ventured into risky enterprises
such as bank fraud and drug trafficking. In the end, some ofthe avtoritet ranked higher
than vory in personal significance. Tensions between the competing kingpins and a
number ofunorganized felons began to accelerate into violence. Yet, few people ever
imagined tWs competition would fundamentally transform Russia's transition to capitalism
and democracy.
The diminished credentials of the vory as the dominant leaders of the criminal
underworld did not signify their demise. The initial decline in the importance of the vory
was misunderstood by the law enforcement community as the end of this form of
organized crime. Law enforcement officials were so convinced of their demise that they
no longer considered them a threat and ceased all casework geared at disabling them.^*
The Soviet bureaucracy was ignorant to the fact that the social and economic conditions
of the time actually encouraged criminal activity.
Stalin, Brezhnev and the Growth ofOrganized Crime
It may seem ironic that in all of Stalin's efforts to have absolute control over the
Russian populace, organized crime would be a factor during his rule. Ironically, Stalin’s
control was so inflexible that the general population needed a means ofacquiring goods.
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themselves.**^ As the demand for unofficial goods that were readily available began to
swell, the black market economy became fully acclimated into society.
This black market economy began to undermine the actual economy; as the
centralized planners saw a lessened demand for goods in the official economy they began
to produce fewer goods. Soviet consumers in the face of these shortages began to turn to
the black marketers, or speculyantz, more often. By 1990 official estimates admitted that
50 percent of the Russian citizens purchased a variety ofgoods fi'om this unofficial market
economy.^^
The marriage between the communist party and criminal elements is an example of
the dramatic changes that were taking place in Russia. Greed, power, and prestige have
replaced ideological goals that were once the highlight of Soviet communism. Vaksburg
characterized the Brezhnev regime from 1964 until 1982 as "ignorant cynics incapable of
dissimulation, vulgarian self-seekers, and it is known as being an era of recession and
political profligacy.”**^ Corruption during his administration was endemic and has been
well documented by Russian scholars other than Vaksburg, including Chalidge in
CriminalRussia and Simms in USSR: Secrets ofa Corrupt Society, who all agree that the
enormous corruption has led to a virtual criminalization of the Russian economy. For
example, the KGB launched an investigation of the Brezhnev regime in 1982. “We have
Goldman, “Why is theMafia,” 40.
Rawlinson, “Russian Organized Crime,” 42.
Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds. Understanding Organized Crime in the GlobalPerspective:
A Reader (London; Sage Publishers, 1997), 15.
44 Ibid., 19.
33
nm into Mafia,” announced team leader Telman Gdlyan in There followed a trial
of the InteriorMinister and his Deputy, Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev’s son-in-law.
Churbanov’s arrest caused a major sensation in the media, despite the fact that he was
only a minor pawn in a corrupt regime. His spoils came from the Uzbekistan Mafia, these
gangsters infiltrated every party apparatus fi’om the district leaders up to the Central
Committee. The next to be caught was the head of the Soviet InteriorMinistry’s anti¬
corruption squad in the Bukhara region; stashed at his home were diamonds, rubies, blue
jeans, thousands of Swiss watches, a million rubles and a full miles length ofgold.^
His boss, the chairman of the Presidium ofUzbekistan collected over 200 pounds
ofgold bullion, 5,000 mint gold coins, 12,000 precious jewels, five cars, eleven television
sets, and hundreds of furs.
The Uzbekistan Mafia used to provide everything fi-om military medals to national
posts and seats on the Presidium. However, another competing Mafia also had various
connections with the Soviet government. The AzerbaijanMafia, headed by Geidan Aliev,
the Soviet Union’s First Deputy Prime Minister, was a full member of the Soviet politburo
and presided over various branches of criminal activity which operated inside the Interior
Ministry’s Division for Fighting Violators of Socialist Property and Speculation.
Nobody was happier with this system than Brezhnev who was comforted by an
awesome supply ofconsumer goods, improved production figures and gifts showered
upon him by contented Mafia leaders.
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At this time, the Soviet government could have easily crushed this illegal
enterprise. But government officials were profiting greatly, and the black market
provided goods that could not be obtained legally fi’om underground factory owners.
Harrison Salisbury (1983) documented an example of this phenomenon in his book, A
Journeyfor Our Times, which highlights the Russians' mindfulness to buy whatever is
obtainable in the early 1980s. In Russia, anyone carrying large boxes or bags could set up
shop by just stopping on a comer and setting down their goods. Lines would appear
almost instantly. Sahsbury explores how the massive shortages are a barometer for the
Russians:
The response was always the same; buy anything ... I could plot the
rise and fall of the economy by shortages and surpluses in the stores, an
abundance, say, ofexpensive clocks and a shortage ofpots and pans
meant more metal going into guns, less for the consumer. If sausage
began to disappear, I knew the harvest was bad and Moscow was
stocking up for a hard winter. If there was nothing for sale at the
women's underwear counter... I knew the cotton crop in Uzbekistan
had failed again. I could follow the fluctuations in foreign trade...
When I found more sidewalk vodka than country girls selling
morozhenoye (ice cream), I knew the daily industry was doing badly
and the government was pouring vodka into the trade system to
increase its revenues and to cater to Russia's chronic alcoholism.^^
Chronic shortages became one ofthe very foundations of organized crime in the Soviet
Union.
The Modern Russian Mafia
The vast network ofunderground criminal organizations spread rapidly in the
1960s and 1970s. New entrepreneurs, the tsekhoviki, refined their skills for the expanding
market for unobtainable products. The Soviet economy was characterized by a far-
Harrison Salisbury,A Journey ofOur Times (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 239.
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reaching underground economic system that was primarily in the hands of the Communist
Party. The alliance among the underground and the authorities helped solidify the system
as being aMafia system, although it differed in one important aspect from the traditional
Mafia. Violence appears in almost all cases to have been exercised not by the underworld
but by those in positions ofpower through purges in Hillman and Schnytzer's
interpretation, or from Boettke and Anderson's viewpoint, government structures
enforcing state mercantilism. As far as can be determined from past accounts, it was the
official sector that competed for payoffs not underground factory owners.'**
The fall of the authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union extended over three
decades, not entirely because of the reforms ofMikhail Gorbachev.**® Gorbachev was not
the first leader to realize the Soviet economy was failing. Khrushchev made several minor
attempts at reforming the system in the early 1960s. PrimeMinister Kosygin was more
successful at providing reform by improving the nation’s profit from investments.™
However, this failed because there were few serious attempts to end the tradition of
centralized rule. The bureaucrats remained steadfastly in favor of the older methods of
governing.
Under Brezhnev all efforts at reforming the economic and political system were set
aside in an atmosphere of corruption and inactivity. The Brezhnev administration
represented the final blow to the communist ideology that was replaced by greed and
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capitalistic excess at the expense of the masses. David Remnick characterizes this period
as:
The Communist party apparatus was the most giganticMafia the world
has ever known. It guarded its monopoly ofpower with a sham
consensus and constitution and backed it up with the force ofthe KGB
and the InteriorMinistry Police ... It was as if the entire Soviet Union
were ruled by a gigantic mob family.^*
At this time the Mafia became fiormly entrenched in the affairs of the state, so much so that
a member ofthe Mafia gave Breshnev a four-foot-high solid gold bust of the leader as a
gift.
The ideological decline under Brezhnev contributed to a 30-year dismantling of the
authoritarian structure. Dmitry Mikheyev observed that from 1956 to 1986 there was a
period ofthe progressive dismantling of the concept ofthe supremacy of communist
doctrine.’^ Advancements in telecommunications allowed outside influences to be
smuggled in despite the best efforts of the ruling elite. Corruption and technology along
with the general inadequacies of the Soviet state allowed for the inevitable destruction of
the communist ideology in Russia.
Gorbachev was well aware of the problems that confronted the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev confided in author George Mitchell that he was foresaw the eventual downfall
ofRussia since the early 1960s. He also acknowledged the economic and political crisis
would eventually turn the country into a second-rate power. Someone would have to be
responsible for changing the system before it collapsed into disrepair. Gorbachev
understood that if the economy was to be modernized it had to overcome the enormous
technological and economic gap with the West. In the process of changing the system,
the communist party also would have to change.
George J. Mitchell, NotforAmericaAlone: The Triumph ofDemocracy and the Fall ofCommunism
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The new Mafia has far outclassed the one flourishing under the former Communist
rule. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Communist Party,
many more gangs have formed competing with one another for control of illegal markets
and territories. They began using violence extensively against competition and
uncooperative legitimate entrepreneurs in early 1992. In Moscow and other major cities
murders and other crimes have increased substantially. Russian authorities have provided
various estimates of the number of crime groups now operating in Russia, ranging fi-om
2,600, ofwhich 300 are "large syndicates," up to 3,000, ofwhich 150 have become "well-
organized fi'atemities."^^
One Mafia source in Moscow provided writer Andrew Solomon with a description
suggesting that Russia's gangs are beginning to resemble the traditional Mafia families.
The source claimed that more and more young people are interested in joining the Mafia.
"When I get in trouble,” one youth stated, "The family helps; I was in prison in Finland,
and they got me out."*"*
According to Handelman, "The crime groups are not only protected, but also in
some cases instructed by government officials and the police."*^ A government report
prepared for President Boris Yeltsin noted that police officers tip offgangs about vehicles
carrying valuable cargo in the city ofTver. The same report noted that 70 to 80 percent
ofprivate businesses and commercial banks in major cities make payoffs of 10 to 20
percent of their turnover to organized crime.*® A majority of this illegal activity involves
selling or trading raw materials at below-market prices. The raw materials are then sold
Handelman, Comrade Criminal, 15.
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in theWest at market prices, and they pocket the difference. The security ministry
(formerly the KGB) is evidently involved in some export businesses, and other companies
have been "set up by the Communist Party to get funds out of the country."^’ A
commodity-trading firm based in Switzerland, headed byMarc Rich, was trading grain,
sugar, and machinery to Russia in exchange for oil and refined aluminum ingot. "Has
Rich bribed influential pals and bureaucrats in the former Soviet Union?" Forbes asked,
"Probably."
Information about the Mafia in Russia is not as detailed as the information that
gathered over the years about the American and Sicilian Mafiosi. Nevertheless, a fairly
clear picture is beginning to come forth. With the demise of the Communist Party, neither
local oflScials nor those in central government agencies seem to be constrained in their
corrupt activities by any high-level authority. Viktor Shchekochikhin, the president of the
Union ofRussian Entrepreneurs, puts it this way:
Before, officials took money in a more or less orderly way, because
they knew people could continue to come back to them. They behaved
properly, ifone can say that. With the arrival of the democrats came
temporaries, who know that in the next elections theywill be thrown
out. They have to assure their future now."*^
Government officials in this era of lawlessness have become fi’ee to compete within
their own realm of influence by using their economic powers and their connections with
the criminal underworld. The continued existence ofmonopoly production in many
sectors of the economy, as well as state control ofmost output in the major industries,
supports their economic influence. This continuing legacy of the old Soviet poUtical
structure ensures that connections will continue to be important in obtaining supplies and
Celestine Bohlen, “Graft and Gangsterism in Russia Blight the Entrepreneurial Spirit,” New York
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services. Private security agencies, often formed by or employing former KGB and
members of the military, may do battle with criminal gangs or front for them. It is widely
believed that criminal gangs using violence may at times be operating under the direction
and protection ofgovernment officials at central or local levels.
There are several obstacles faced by the government in combating corruption,
violence and business fraud. The law itself is vague and incomplete because there is a
general lack of consensus on what is sanctioned, ethical, and acceptable versus what
should be subject to criminal prosecution. Russian political leaders have not established
the means to prevent criminal activity. For example, banks and security firms are
completely unregulated.*® The extent of corruption, its acceptance, and
institutionalization as a reward to those loyal to the conununist regime in the Soviet era
makes corruption too lucrative to abandon. The political forces that support an anti¬
corruption campaign place their supporters as well as their opponents in jeopardy. Even
legitimate law enforcement efforts against gang violence and protection rackets may affect
the corrupt interests ofgovernment officials.
Anders Aslund notes the current problem in Russia is the weakness ofthe political
leadership with respect to the economic stabilization ofRussia.** The crimes involving
entrepreneurship were monopolized bymany ofthe former vary who were involved in the
“scabs war^’ or were members who no longer believed in the old ideology. The new
generation of criminals who did not adhere to the traditions are more entrepreneurial in
their approach and have become vary because of their great wealth rather than status
gained through long prison sentences and their compliance to criminal codes and
regulations. The traditional symbols ofthe vary, such as extensive body tattoos, are being
forsaken. The new vory are openly enjoying the fiiiits oftheir labor. One aspect of the
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traditional code that retains its weight is punishment for anyone who insults a vory.
Physical assaults or insulting the authority of the vory must be answered with a harsh and
timely response.
Because ofthe new economic system, the breakdown of social institutions, rapidly
rising inflation, and the advent of capitalism in a nation that is relatively unprepared for
this change the vory v zakone is attracting many young converts into their sphere of
influence. A common mistake among researchers is to attribute the current instability
among the criminal elite to up-and-coming juveniles who refuse to bow to traditions.
Although there certainly are young criminals who are in competition with the vory, the
latter still control vast numbers ofjuveniles across the former Soviet Union.
Beyond the increasing number ofvory v zakone, there are other instances where the
new morals ofthe vory come into question. This is exemplified by the very real threat of
the sale ofnuclear arms by Russian gangsters. In the past the vory would never deal with
national governments. However, the modem gangster has no qualms about selling
nuclear materials to pariah nations. Claire Sterling in an address before the Center for
Strategic and International Studies Conference on Organized Crime noted that radioactive
materials have been smuggled out ofRussia since 1991.“ She continues by stating these
materials may or may have not been used for nuclear arms but still represent a threat to
international security. It is a threat to society because Russia is in a state of chaos. In one
case high level officials and former KGB officers supported the traffickers.
The traffickers in their signed deposition went on to describe their transition and
agreements involving more than 20 countries, not all of them necessarily in lesser
developed nations. The Christian Broadcast Network reported that one of these nations
was South Korea. The Russian Mafia’s infiltration into “legitimate” government
institutions, dealing with transnational criminal organizations, ability to sell nuclear and
“ Claire Sterling, “Redfellas,” NewRepublic, 11 April 1994, 15-18.
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Other arms, and to generally undermine the national economy has made the once small
organization a multinational menace.
Organized crime flourished on the heels ofuntamed activity that now characterizes
the Russian economy and political situation. The growth ofcrime in Russia is
unrestrained and raises serious questions about the future ofthe nation. Democratic
reform can be threatened by a strong public outcry against theMafia. Such opposition




Many political scientists are uncomfortable with the changing role ofRussia after
the fall of communism in 1991. The old theory ofcontaining the Communist threat in
Russia almost seems nostalgic when one considers the many “benefits” ofthe bipolar
rivalry . One such benefit was the idea that the enemy ofdemocratic, capitalist nations
was the Soviet Union. This was advantageous because one could sign treaties with one
or several individuals who spoke for the masses. The inception oforganized crime as
the largest political entity in the former Soviet Union has created a dilemma.
One ofthe greatest challenges facing contemporary political scientists is
understanding the major changes occurring in the former Soviet Union. It is abundantly
clear that its transition to democracy does not fit into the “classical” model ofdemocratic
transitions. The former Soviet Union is experiencing the first wave ofdemocracy away
fi’om autocratic rule that began with the Portuguese Revolution of 1974 and seems to
have reached its height with the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe.*
At the same time, an impressive accord has come forth concerning the minimal
conditions that regimes must fiilfill in order to be considered democratic. Many scholars
have been abandoning the old terminology that was used to describe a democracy in the
’ Talbott Strobe, “Democracy and the National Interest,” ForeignAffairs, November/December 1996,49.
and Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Lyim Karl, “WhatDemocracy is.. .and is not?” Journal ofDemocracy
6, no. 3 (July 1995); 75.
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past. Consequently, one is led to the inevitable question ofhow to define a democracy
and the general characteristics that distinguish it from other forms ofgovernance. A
single definition is difficult in this case because there are many types ofdemocracy, yet
their varied methodology produces a similar set ofeffects.
A modem democracy is classified as a system ofgovernance in which citizens
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected
representative’s hold mlers accountable for their actions in the public realm. A
democracy is, furthermore, a system ofgovernance in which the rights of its citizens are
guaranteed and protected. To secure the rights of its citizens and to deliver other services
the populace demands, a democratic government as well as any regime must be able to
exercise effectively its claim to be the sole source of the legitimate use of force in its
territory.^ A democracy needs the ability to command, to manage and extract tax
revenue.^ For this, a democracy is sustained by an operative state with a bureaucracy
considered to be usable by the government.
In Russia, there is not an adequately functioning state; this fact severely
undermines the notion that the nation is democratic. It possesses an insufficient system
of taxation where much of the populace eludes taxation by simple evasion or by paying
the Mafia instead. Russia has a weak normative and bureaucratic presence in much of its
country; such that citizens cannot effectively demand their rights be respected nor is the
nation viewed as the sole source of legitimate force in Russia. The question of the
usability ofthe state bureaucracy by the new democratic government also emerges where
^
Joseph Schmpter, Capitalism, Socialism andDemocracy (London; George Allen, 1943), 269.
^ Juan J. Linz and Alfied Stephan “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” The Journal ofDemocracy 7,
no. 2 (April 1996): 20.
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the outgoing autocratic regime was able to give preference to many key members of the
party.
Unlike past administrations, the new and fragile democracies that have grown
since 1974 have outside influences earlier democracies did not experience. Because of
contemporary circumstances they may never acquire the diverse channels of
representation in the gradual progression oftheir predecessors.'* Considering there
limitations Robert Dahl has suggested a modified criteria consisting ofthe minimal
conditions for political democracy to exist:
1. Control over government decisions about policy is
constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted
elections in which coercion is relatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to run for elected office.
4. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of
severe punishment on political matters broadly defined ...
5. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of
information.
6. ... Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent
associations or independent political parties and interest groups.^
While these six requirements capture the essence ofprocedural democracy for many
scholars, Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl have two additional conditions,
required for an effective democracy:
7. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their
constitutional powers without being subject to overriding
opposition from officials who are not elected. In this case, if
military officers, civil servants or state managers maintain the
Schmitter andKarl, “What Democracy is,” 80.
^Ibid.
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ability to act independently ofelected civil servants, then
democratic reform may be fleeting.
8. The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act
independent of restraint imposed by some other overarching
political organization. However, with the development of
supranational blocs, alliances and spheres of influence, the
question ofthe level ofautonomy a nation needs to be
considered representative will probably change and remains
hotly debated.^
Democratic Consolidation in Russia
Russia inherited nostalgia for an empire and many undemocratic values, habits and
routines from its past. Due to this, post-communist transitions are unique in many ways
from the traditions of the past. The global expansion of the democratic pattern implies a
movement from the “solid” democracies that embodied the economic or cultural
conditions that created more stable democracies. This passion for freedom has become a
dispassionate recognition of democratic procedures as conventions ofmodem
civilizations.^ At best, democracy in Russia has been unconsolidated; at worst, it has
been an inaccurate claim. Given Russia's past it is not surprising that political life in
Russia is contradictory and produces a level ofuncertainty for the future ofdemocracy.*
Although the nation has made great strides in departing from Soviet norms, the rift
between what the Russian government practices and democratic theory remains vast.
President Mikhail Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to radically alter the
system ofgovernance. The reforms under Gorbachev were highlighted by numerous
“Ibid.
^ Ghia Nodia, “HowDifferent are Post-Communist Transitions?” JournalofDemocracy 1, no. 4
(October 1996); 24.
® Balcerowicz, Socialism, Cajntalism and Transformation, 88.
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slogans fromperstroika (restructuring), glasnost (openness) and demokratizatsiia
(democratization). Initially these political programs did not bring about the changes that
would have been considered democratization, as briefly defined earlier, but inserted the
reforms which would allow the regime to function more effectively and would give the
citizens a sense ofcommitment to that system.® With the renewed commitment,
Gorbachev hoped their popular activism would place pressure on officials to alter the
present political structure. One ofthe first policies was glasnost, which was created to
bring some pressure on the officials who were not performing adequately. By 1990, this
idea grew into an uncontrollable movement. Soon no issue was too sensitive for the
media to bring up, including an examination of the legitimacy of the present system.
Unrestricted discussion increased as the bureaucrats used this medium to sway public
„ 10opinion.
An important result oiglasnost was liberalizing the national laws. This principle
implied that the despotic rules of the past were to be replaced with democratic ones.
Theoretically, this measure should have provided some refuge for the public against the
whims of the ruling class. However, in the pattern of failure that consistently shadows
Russia's transition to democratic rule, the government did not perform as it was expected.
Second, a substantial portion ofthe program was Gorbachev's policy of
demokratizatsiia. This policy began at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum,
with a few competitive elections ofparty secretaries and conference delegates in 1987
and the first halfof 1988, this policy formally was unraveled at the XIX Conference. In
® Graeme Gill, “Liberalism andDemocratization in the Soviet Union andRussia,” Journal ofDemocracy
2, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 319.
Ibid, 320.
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Gorbachev's report to the Coiference he advocated multi-candidate elections with a
secret ballot and a limit on tile number of terms in office. * * He recommended they adopt
an innovative preeminent organization called the Congress ofPeople's Deputies, elected
by the general population, and a Supreme Soviet that is elected by the Congress.
Ironically, he advocated the removal of the communist party from a direct administrative
role; this action brought into questionwhere his true loyalties reside. These proposals
were endorsed and accepted by the Conference, with changes to the state and electoral
stmcture being created by constitutional amendments and a new electoral law in
December 1988. The removal of the communist party from a direct role in Russian life
was completed formally by the constitutional amendment ofMarch 1991 which
eliminated the party's official leading role from the constitution.*^
This outline is merely a brief synopsis ofthe policy of liberalization under
Gorbachev and does hot give a full picture of the interpersonal dynamics, which
characterized the way it developed. The policies were not planned by a unified elite, nor
was it a plan carefully thought out in advance and implemented according to a
predetermined schedule.*^ It was often ad hoc and subject to the impulses ofshifting
political contingencies. Gorbachev's path toward democracy likewise allowed the
growth of thousands of rank and file organizations that were against his reforms.*^ The
“ Aiyeh L. Unger, “The Travails of Intra-Party Democracy in the Soviet Union; The Elections to the 19*
Conference of the CPSU,” SovietStotfies 43, no. 1 (December 1991): 330.
Gill, “Liberalism andDemocratization,” 321.
Ibid., 322.
Seymour Lipset et al., “Russia,” in TheB^clope^a ofDemocracy, vol. HI (WashingtonDC;
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 1090.
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elections of the parliament in 1989 and 1990, in which Boris Yeltsin was elected into
office, were other landmark occurrences in this process.*^
With all the dramatic changes occurring in Russia, democratization was still
incomplete because the communist regime and the approach toward authority,
responsibility and representation are essentially unchanged. The transition also was
halted by Gorbachev's commitment to the communist party. In August 1991, a group of
military and civilian leaders attempted to overthrow the government and reverse the
mounting reforms. The defeat of the coup d'etat inevitably led to the collapse ofthe
Gorbachev regime and of the Soviet Union itself In Russia the discontinuation ofthe
ruling party and the seizure of its property by the Yeltsin regime both executed the
democratization process. The process ofchange ended. In one respect, the “democrats”
who had come into powerwere not qualified to take control and were unsure ofwhat to
do; in another respect, opposition soon developed to the current democratic order; in yet
another respect, the reforms after Gorbachev’s regime were just a front forMafia-
controlled communism.
Prior to the coup, the term democrats and democracy for that matter was an
expression to describe anti-Communists in general.*® With the collapse of the
communist system the democrats lost their nemesis. What was meant by a democratic
orientation thereafter was much harder to decipher.
One reason democratic reform in Russia stalled in 1992-1993 was the stalemate
between the executive branch and both ofthe legislatures. Indeed, the mostly communist
Gill, “Liberalism andDemocratization,” 319-321.
Lipset et al., “Russia,” 1090.
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officials who were elected before the collapse ofthe Soviet Union comprised a
substantial number of former Communist officials who not only feared losing their jobs
and privileges but opposed the political and economic reforms as well.
The Capture ofParliament, Elections and Constitution
When a new stalemate began on September 21,1993, President Yeltsin dissolved
the parliament and called for new elections.Vice President Aleksander Rutskoi and
some ofhis deputies refused to adhere to these rules and called for an armed strike
against the Moscow media and the city government. The entire Russian government
found itself in a state ofchaos, and only after some hesitancy did army and secret police
contingents on October 3-4, 1993, obey Yeltsin's orders to occupy the parliament and
place the remaining deputies under arrest.^®
Although carried out in the name ofdemocratic reforms, the siege of the
parliament building did not strengthen the democratic reputation of the current regime.
The ensuing democratic reforms were intended to provide a validation to the
administration. They drafted a constitution that provided a pluralist political system and
an array ofcivil and human rights, including the right to run for office, the right of
assembly and the right to own private property.*® It authorized a popularly elected
president and a bicameral parliament, with the lower house, the State Duma, elected by
the voters and the upper house, the Council of the Federation, comprised of two deputies
Gill, “Liberalism andDemocratization,” 328.
Lipset et al. “Thieves Professing the Co<te,” 1091.
’®Ibid., 1092.
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from each ofRussia's 88 regions and republics.^” What puts the constitution in question
is that it draws heavily from the French Constitution, which was picked to ensure that
President Yeltsin retained a strong executive grip the state. This is evident from the
March 22,1998, firing ofthe cabinet and vice president by Yeltsin. He is able to wield
this control because the constitution is weighted heavily toward the presidential system,
minimizing the role of the parliament, which secures President Yeltsin's rule.^^ Yeltsin
personally oversaw the drafting ofRussia’s constitution and guaranteed his authority
would prevail in any legislative conflict, as a result, Yeltsin can dismiss the parliament or
cabinet members on impulse or the fact that he is able to legally ignore the rulings of the
constitutional court and the Duma.
The failure of the democrats lies in the disappointing election results that was
demonstrated in the rise ofantidemocratic groups. This weakening ofdemocratic forces
between 1991 and 1995 had a number of causes. The first was, there were only a few
people committed to altering the government. For another, the next three years had
given other groups ample time to organize, including both the nationalistic forces and the
neo-communists. At the same time, there were a lot of forces defying, or more often
simply ignoring, the political leadership. In the end, the democrats became synonymous
with crime, chaos, ineffectiveness, a dramatic decline in living conditions, and with
capitalist nations, whose aid proved to be disappointing at best, and at worst deemed to
be sustaining corrupt leaders and organized crime.
^ Robert B. Blackwill, Rodric Braithwaite and Tanaka Akihiko, EngagingRussia (New York: The
Trilateral Commission, 1995), 93.
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Western models and values were increasingly perceived as being reprehensible
and volatile, with their emphasis on consumer goods and capitalism, a deep departure
from Soviet norms. Finally, it was evident that although the old communist party was
officially gone, many of its former officials and advocates were effectively obstructing
AM
the nation's transition to a democratic regime.
If the patterns ofdevelopment from liberalization implemented by Gorbachev to
democratization described earlier are true, the consolidation ofdemocratization in Russia
would require at least strong political institutions and a general commitment ofthe
political elite for similar goals. The first was the political elite to be banded in favor of
democratization or for the internal political conflict to be resolved by the overwhelming
supremacy or total victory of that section willing to press for democratization. Second,
political actors who are not part of the elite class are able to call for a democracy. One or
both of these will create the needed preconditions for democracy to flourish.
In many cases, some ofthe former elites played a decisive role in the demise of the
communist administration. Their motives were duplicitous; they needed to control the
vast wealth that officially belonged to the state, and desired to remove themselves from
the communist ideology that would hinder them from maximizing their own interests.^'*
The relative ease with which communism was abandoned by the upper echelon ofthe
party raises the question ofwhether reform in late communist society was used as a mere
“window dressing.”




Russia lacks the strong institutions - such as a parliament, local government, the
press, political parties, the church and labor unions. All of them are weak and struggling
to find their way. Frequently, they have been muscled aside by the enormous power
wielded in Russia by organized crime and corruption. These democratic institutions in
Russia are used exclusively as the democratic facade for Mafiocracy, the way they were
used in the days of the Soviet Union. The facade included many conflicting
developments in Russia. It had the most democratic constitution ofany formerly
communist nation (which did not work), guaranteed its people fi'eedom of speech (and
put into mental institutions those who tried to exercise this fi'eedom), held fi'ee elections
(on which Communist Party candidates invariably received 99.8% ofvotes).^^ Such a
facade, plus effective use ofdemocratic rhetoric by the Communist leaders allowed
many to concur that democratic consolidation was under way in Russia. The world
believes in the Russian Free Elections (won by an unpopular incumbent President), in
Russian Democracy (which only 8% ofthe Russian population thinks to be more
democratic than Communism and where the impeached President sends tanks to shell the
Parliament), and the democratic leader Boris Yeltsin (formerly one of the top communist
party officials), to name a few of the great contradictions of the new regime. The former
communist leaders were able to utilize the very same plan developed by the early
communists, this was to: employ the right kind ofdemocratic rhetoric, use democracy as
“Ibid.
“ Alexandre Konanykhine andElena Gratcheva, “Mafiocracy in Russia,” , accessed 21 May 1998.
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a facade and good KGB misinformation specialists to control the Press, courts and
people by extrajudicial methods.^^
To best summarize the prevailing mood of the Russian populace, Alexandre
Solzhenitsyn wrote in the end of 1996 “the system [in Russia] in just as uncontrollable,
lacking any public responsibility and immune from punishment as the Communist power
was. As much as we wish to, it cannot be called democracy.”^*
It should be noted, after all, that Russia’s future is not completely bleak and the
nation has taken tremendous strides in spite ofobvious deficiencies. Transitions to
democracy are bound to take time. One should not underestimate the impact of a free
press, television, radio and ofopen policy debates by rival parties and speakers.
Although the danger ofmass violence remains, especially if the economic situation does
not change or if it continues to get worse, the transformation of the Soviet Union has
taken place with relatively few casualties.
As a stable democracy, nevertheless, Russia has a lot ofwork ahead of it. It is
often noted that this type of rule must become institutionalized and must evoke the
informed cooperation ofall those involved. Taking this into account, Russia is not a
stable democracy. Its institutions are amix of the autocratic past coexisting with
democratic reforms and modemMafia involvement. There is only partial acceptance of
the government's authority, partially because of the cormption and organized crime that
exists in the government. The notion ofthe general rights ofthe citizen has yet to be





RUSSIAN COMMUNISM VS. MAFIOCRACY
Russian Communism Mafiocracy
1. Based onMarxism 1. Not state based: predicated
on demise ofnation-state
2. Centralized governmental or complicit with compromised
Ruling
control government officials
3. Controlled elections 2. Decline ofcentralized authority:
replaced by leaders in collusion
or complicit with the Mafia
3. Infiltration oforganized crime
into state structures which
undermines democracy and
national authority.
1. Submission ofCitizens’ 1. National corruption undermines
interests to the state and integrity ofthe government
Citizens communist party
Rights 2. Abjuration of the nation’s
2. Compulsion ofthe Obligations to its citizen’s
citizen by state legal
system 3. State is unable to protect
Its citizens from organized
3. Citizens often enlisted
to fulfill the state’s
Crime groups
objectives
4. State restricts civil
society and denies human
rights
4. Sedition ofemergent civil
society
^ Blackwell et al., EngagingRussia, 91.
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TABLE 1 (Corn.)
RUSSIAN MAFIA VS. MAFIOCRACY
Basic
Liberties
1. State control over
film, art, mass media
and criminal law
1. Intimidation ofthe media
2. Acquisition ofmass media to
circumscribe news coverage
3. Intimidation of scholars
1. Centralized economy
2. State domination of
1. Organized criminals control large
sectors ofthe economy
Economy workers or labor
unions
2. Intimidation ofworkers and
labor unions
3. Disorganized areas that
are not immune to the
Mafia
3. Exploit privatization process
of national economies to gain
control ofessential industries







4. Creation ofnew monopolies
5. Strategic alliances with
other criminal organizations
for economic objectives
6. Mafia guarantees business
transactions in absence of
government control
56
Political associations that are essential to competition are developing but are still
in their infancy. Russians still view political parties with much suspicion and generally
are not instrumental in their success. The political parties that do exist are largely
dependent on ideological sentiments or personalities. Despite this fact, organizations are
beginning to appear, such as the coalitions formed by successfiil entrepreneurs such as
Boris Berezovsky, one of the most outspoken of the Russian business magnates, a
reputed leader in the RussianMafia and perhaps the most well-connected to the Kremlin.
While all this occurs, the workers (who ironically the communists are supposed to be
concerned with the most) are not formally represented in the government.
Similarly, the new Russian government does not ensure the protection ofminority
rights; again the current practice is less than desired. There is a lack ofprotection for the
individual as well as for group rights; once more the rise oforganized crime is hurting
the transition because people are not sufficiently protected by the government. The
bureaucrats also prove to be unwilling to help their own citizens.
One reason that leaders of the former Soviet Union embraced democracy was
because Russia was faced with being one only a few totalitarian governments. It was,
moreover, confi-onted by the apparent rapid retreat of communism in the region. It is
often referenced in pessimistic theses about the ideology that communism was unable to
evolve, and some elements within these governments were forced to change to preserve
their dominant roles. This means the optimistic discussions about the success of
bloodless revolutions may need to be reexamined, the supposedly unwavering
communists were able to maneuver with remarkable skill and the old ways of thinking
were able to persist with remarkable perseverance. The acceptance ofanti-Communist
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representatives who assiduously block or lessen any vital legislation against crime. This
inflicts considerable doubt on the supremacy of the state. Corrupt officials and legislators
who are associated with theMafia impede in legislation that might go against organized
crime; dishonest legislators in Russia have struck down all specific measures against
corruption, organized crime, money laundering as well as a witness protection
program.** Threats to personal security and property, prostitution, worsening drug
trafficking and unchecked governmental theft all tend to increase the appeal of a dictator
as a political leader.
Both communist and ultra-nationalist politicians have sought to exploit this
sentiment. In his 1993 election campaign, Vladimir Zhirinovskv promised to wipe out
crime within three months by arresting half a million people. He called for the mass
execution of 10,000 mobsters. Before more sophisticated audiences, he called for
gangsters to receive unofficial permission to run drug-trafficking and prostitution rings,
while leaving "legitimate" businesses alone. Such simplistic formulas could gain
widespread support fi’om a desperate Russian populace. Moreover, a future regime could
use the rise in crime and corruption as an excuse to weaken the private sector and reverse
progress toward greater protection of individual rights.**
The economic toll of the crime in Russia is as serious as its political cost. The
creation ofmarkets in Russia has not been accompanied by the development of
mechanisms for protecting consumers and law enforcement. As a result, ordinary
citizens are being defi'auded of hundreds ofmillions ofdollars. When a company called
Yuriy A. Voronin, “The Emerging Criminal State: Economic and Political Aspects ofOrganized
Crime in Russia,” in Russian OrganizedCrime:A New Threat, ed. FM Williams (Portland: Frank Cass
Publishers, 199"^, 57.
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Independent Oil Concern stole hundreds of thousands ofdollars in deposits and
transferred the money abroad, the Russian state procurator's office did not even bother to
investigate.^^ Such frauds not only pilfer billions of rubles, but also discredit the very
idea of capital markets. Shares of disreputable companies, such as Tele-Market, are sold
by mobsters in numerous retail shops around Russia with the full cooperation of the
police. Despite the fall of the communist ideology, many Russians view business as
being illegitimate. Uncontrolled crime and corruption are hindering people from
becoming entrepreneurs, thus weakening the long-term prospects of the Russian
economy.
Development of the rule of law is a key element ofdemocratic reform. Yet
precious little has been achieved on this front. Judges' rulings frequently are usually not
enforced. Companies get little protection from the police, who are often in league with
the mob.^'* Occasionally, an honest law officer is brutally murdered to settle scores and
to set an example.
In terms of international political and economic safety, there is no greater fear than
the unlawful sale ofnuclear weapons. The end of centralized control over the military
since 1991 has opened up the possibility of sales ofnuclear components and materials.
The illegal trade in weapons ofmass destruction that has developed creates serious
problems of interpretation for policy makers and analysts. In one respect, nuclear
smuggling seems to be a minimal threat due to its current fragmented, decentralized and
Annelise G. Anderson, TheRedMafia: A Legacy ofCommunism,, accessed 5 January 1998.
Yarslav Shimov, “The Russian Citizen is Easily Defrauded, but it isDifficult to Punish a Crook,” The
WorldPress Review, July 1994, 43.
^
Douglas Farah, “FBI Chief: Russian Mafia Pose Growing Threat to US,” The Washington Post, 2
October 1997, 18 (A).
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chaotic nature.^^ Concurrently, however, this activity initiates new criminal trade
channels and increases the potential opportunities for nuclear proliferation. Although
there is little actual evidence ofnuclear weapons being sold, uranium production
facilities are scattered throughout the former Soviet Union. Factories are located in
Ukraine as well as in unstable areas such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan. Unguarded stocks of nuclear components lie in research facilities throughout
the former Soviet Union. Moreover, former Soviet nuclear scientists who were able to
secure employment in their homeland are currently working in Algeria, Korea, India,
China, Iraq, Iran and Libya.
The most famous case of local government, military and the Mafia conspiring to
sell nuclear materials was the Vilnius nuclear scandal which occurred in Vilnius, the
capital ofLithuania in May 1993. For months, there had been rumors about a strange
shipment ofgreat value being transported to the city. After conversations with several
informants, the chiefof the organized crime unit, Joseph Rimkevicius, was able to
confirm the rumors.^^ Detectives were told to search the basement storage rooms at the
capital’s largest bank, the Lithuanian Joint-Stock Innovation Bank, and found shipping
papers that indicated there were 4.4 tons ofberyllium at the bank and two other
locations. Beryllium is a valuable and legal commodity that is also a critical material for
building a more efficient nuclear warhead or a similar nuclear reactor.^’ The beryllium
seizure was significant.
Jim Leitzel, Russian EconomicReform (London: Routledge, 1995), 109.
^ Tim Zimmerman and Alan Cooperman, “Beryllium Deal, Russian Mafia,” USNews and World
Report, 23 October 1995,58.
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Since the end ofthe cold war, authorities in Russia and the United States have
argued that amateurs largely did nuclear-related smuggling. Yet the seizure in Lithuania,
according to a five-month investigation by USNews andWorldReports and 60Minutes
provides the first hard evidence that the Russian Mafia was behind the shipment found in
Lithuania. The trail of the smuggled nuclear material wound fi’om a restricted nuclear
facility to Vilnius and ultimately to Switzerland, where a buyer was prepared to pay
about 10 times the market value for the materials. In addition to beryllium, uranium and
cesium also were found. Both these items are essential fuels for nuclear weapons.’* No
one was able to identify the perspective buyer who represented North Korean interests.
There is clear evidence that uranium and plutonium, the fissionable components of
nuclear weapons, can be purchased if the price is right. More than 100 smugglers have
already been arrested, although several have died or become severely ill from
mishandling the materials. A particular pattern has been established to suggest that
Russian KGB and military officers supply the materials, and then ItalianMafiosi resell
them to buyers in the Middle East.
Transshipments have been made in Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden. But
the direct route is even easier: across the Black or Caspian Sea to Iran, Iraq or Libya. An
example of this new brand ofnuclear trader is former Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) official Shaaban Hafez Shaaban, who is currently based in Moscow. Shaaban,
who calls himself "the head of the Palestinian government in exile," recently boasted in a
newspaper interview that he had purchased two "surplus" neutron bombs formerly
belonging to the USSR and hidden one in the Jordanian desert and the other in southern
Ibid, 62.
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Lebanon. He declared these weapons would eventually be used in attacks on Tel Aviv
and West Jerusalem.^^ Operatives of the Russian Mafia have cooperated with the
Sicilian mob in the international transport ofheroin, and with Colombian cartels in
shipping cocaine. It is completely feasible that this alliance can be used to ship drugs
along with nuclear weapons. The Russians are an up-and-coming force in the
increasingly globalized world of crime. Buying real estate, casinos and industrial
enterprises in Russia has become a safe way for the SicilianMafia to launder money
obtained fi-om their Colombian associates. Russian criminal groups are setting up banks
and businesses throughout the Caribbean to launder money. Shuffled electronically
through a host ofcompanies, these funds often find their way into respectable investment
portfolios or are reinvested as legitimateWestern money in the emerging markets of the
East.'*®
Opium poppies and marijuana have grown naturally in Europe and Asia for
centuries. With the collapse of strict police controls, drug cultivation has reached an all-
time high. Organized crime controls three million acres ofopium poppies in Central
Asia.'*^ The authorities are in a disheartening position. Russian organized crime
jeopardizes the emergence of a lawful economic and political order in the entire former
Soviet Union.
Azeris, Georgians and Turkic-speaking Central Asians play an important role in
the connection between the drug manufacturers ofAsia and West European markets.
Uzbek and Tajik groups from Afghanistan have close connections in the Central Asian
Valery Vyzhutovich, “Brotherly Fate, Comrade in Arms,” The WorldPress Review, May 1994,27.
Farah, “FBI Chief,” 18 (A).
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governments. The Central Asians, in turn, are plugged into the power structure in
Moscow."*^ Russia has become more than just a transit point for heroin from the Far
East. The Russian Mafia has established footholds in Hong Kong, Singapore and
Bangkok, where it cooperates with the Chinese Triads.
In a half-hearted attempt to control the growth ofthe mob. President Boris Yeltsin
announced yet another anti-crime campaign in the summer of 1994, this one prompted
by the murders of a Duma deputy and several prominent bankers, as well as rising
violence against leading business owners. It was the seventh campaign annoimced since
he took office. The nucleus of this initiative was Presidential Decree 1226, dated June
14, 1994, and entitled "On Urgent Measures to Protect the Population Against
Gangsterism and Other Manifestations ofOrganized Crime. The decree granted
increased powers to police and prosecutors;’ allowing them to conduct arrests and
searches ofpremises and vehicles without court orders or the presence ofwitnesses. It
also allowed the imprisonment ofcitizens for up to 30 days without formal charges.
Moreover, it allowed the seizure ofthe financial records and business correspondence of
any company or individual associated with anyone suspected ofbeing involved in
organized criminal activity within the previous five years. The FSK (former KGB) and
police were given unlimited access to search for and seize financial and business secrets.
Finally, in a return to the authoritarian past, the decree stipulated that the secret
testimony of informants, whose identity would be concealed from the accused and their
defense, would be admissible as evidence.
'"Ibid.
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Decree 1226 violated several basic individual liberties proclaimed in the new
Russian Constitution ofDecember 1993. Many politicians had few qualms about the
illegal order, but not everyone was satisfied. Veteran Russian freedom fighter and
presidential human rights commissioner Sergei A. Kovalev declared;
The Decree not only clashes with legal procedures and current
legislation. It contradicts the Constitution, in precisely that part which
an especially involved procedure for instituting changes has been put
forward.'*^
By promulgating the decree. President Yeltsin clearly encroached on the
parliamentary right to alter the criminal code, and abrogated constitutional procedures
and liberties. On June 23, 1994, the Duma voted overwhelmingly to suspend the decree,
citing eight violations of the Constitution and individual rights, but President Yeltsin
refused to withdraw it. The decree failed to address the underlying sources ofcrime and
corruption in Russia and thus has been ineffective in deterring criminal activity. The
vary were warned in advance and remained out of trouble. Lower level criminals picked
up in police raids were released.
Ending Crime in Russia
Nothing in history compares too this cancer consuming the largest country in the
world. Devoured by criminal bandits and corruption from within Russia seems helpless
to save itself. To end this era of lawlessness and save the democratic reforms several
changes are feasible in the area of law enforcement. First, the Russian government
should create a new anti-corruption organization. Crime and security experts have
Natalya Grevorkian, “Attention; The President’s DecreeWorks,” Moscow News, 1-7 July 1994, (A).
Seitive Bodies give the Green Light,”Moscow News, 1-7 July 1994,1-2.
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suggested it would be more effective to recruit new, well-paid, highly motivated
specialists to staff such an organization than to utilize existing personnel. Currently,
mob informants, who have consistently leaked highly sensitive information to the Mafia,
penetrate the offices of theMVD (InteriorMinistry) and the FSK.
Russian law enforcement authorities should go after the leaders of the Mafia.
They should be allowed to pursue all politicians and bureaucrats involved in criminal
activities regardless of their position. Legislative bodies should introduce the conflict-
of-interest doctrine into local law. Legislators should create ethics codes applicable to all
public officials. Legislators should be allowed to arraign mob leaders, whose identities
are often well known.
Judiciary reform is an important undertaking. Formerly communist judges do not
have the training or legal knowledge to deal successfully with the new laws needed for
market and property rights. All judges must become knowledgeable about both criminal
and civil law. For democracy to be taken seriously, however, new judges must be
recruited and trained, particularly in study programs in stable democracies. Judges from
the Soviet era may be relegated to technical positions, such as traffic-court adjudicators
and so on. The civil courts must be upgraded so they can handle private-sector disputes,
obviating the need for Russians to resort to theMafia. The state also needs to enforce
court orders and rulings to fiirther legitimize the system.
Changes also must be made in the military and nuclear fields. Security, inventory
management and accountability at nuclear production and storage facilities must be
upgraded. The Russian inventory system is so antiquated and inefficient that the
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government does not know exactly how many weapons they have.'*^ Russian law
enforcement agencies need to identify potential arms smugglers and intercept them.
Anyone attempting to pilfer nuclear material should be prosecuted. Russia, Ukraine and
other states also must cooperate with Western governments in order to identify and
intercept potential clients who attempt to purchase nuclear items, especially those from
"rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria.
Economic policy also should be targeted. The bureaucratic regulation ofthe
economy must be curbed. By selling illegal export licenses, business permits and
subsidized credits, bureaucrats have become the wealthiest people in Russia. In tackling
this powerful bureaucracy, the political leadership would not only liberate the
entrepreneur and consumer but also strengthen the economy. In terms of real economic
reform the country must confront tax evasion. In Russia many businesses and the new
wealthy elite do not pay taxes they merely pay the kripha to the local Mafia. Leaders
must implement a system that both enforces the adequate collection of taxes yet does not
create such a burden on people who do pay. In other words, taxes should not be so
oppressive that average citizens feel that it is cheaper to payMafia extortionists than
federal taxes.
A great deal could be accomplished by cooperating withWest and Central
European governments. One promising project is the development ofa shared computer
data system, involving Interpol, the United States and other European police forces.
However, western participants should bear in mind that mob informants have penetrated
the police forces ofthe former Soviet Union. Intelligence that has the potential to
endanger or compromise Western sources should not yet be shared. Still, the FBI's
PatriciaWilson, “Russian ‘Sure’ ofBombs,” Reuters, 2 October 1997, accessed 15 Januaiy 1998.
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cooperative experiences with Italian agencies have shown that credible, reliable law
enforcement officers exist even in corruption-riddled agencies. Reliable law
enforcement personnel in Russia should be sought out and entrusted with cooperative
operations.
Russia should receive Western help in developing comprehensive criminal,
procedural and administrative laws. Such assistance should focus on the drafting laws
regarding organized crime and corruption, morality codes for civil servants and
administrative law. Moreover, judges and prosecutors should receive training in how to
handle actual cases of organized crime.
Russia should cooperate to develop and implement a witness-relocation program.
Such programs have proven to be very effective in prosecuting Mafiosi in the United
States and Italy, and Russia has already asked for assistance in formulating its own
program. Moreover, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program, a highly successful program to train police officers, should receive additional
funding sufficient to extend it to all ofEastern Europe.
The greatest security threat posed to theWest by the post-communist crime wave
is trafficking in nuclear materials and narcotics. The FBI, the CIA and other
intelligence-gathering organizations must join forces to track and penetrate the criminal
structures involved in these activities. Efforts to track money launderers should be
stepped up, and the criminals arrested.
In short, the post-communist societies now face a major threat from the fusion of
a ruthless post-Soviet Mafia, a highly capable and influential staffof former party
members and KGB officials, and the criminal elite. Throughout the region, organized
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crime has penetrated the private sector, discrediting markets, undermining democratic
institutions and impeding investment. These developments could trigger a communist or
ultranationalist backlash in Russia as well as in other states in the region. Moreover, the
West is directly threatened by emerging Russian and Eurasian criminal organizations as
they enter global alliances with the Sicilian and AmericanMafia, the Cali drug cartel and
other crime syndicates. These organizations are already armed with sophisticated
conventional arms, and they may have access to weapons ofmass destruction as well.
Unchecked, this new" international criminal" could become as dangerous as its
communist predecessor. It is imperative that the post-Soviet states and theWest join
forces to stamp out this threat before it grows too powerful to control.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
There is a major difference between the challenge posed by theMafia and those
posed by pariah nations. As a rule, nations do not exist in a constant state ofconflict.
Even during the cold war, when cooperation was not feasible, communication was always
possible. With organized crime, there is no possibility for diplomacy. These tools have no
meaning to those whose intentions are to exploit individuals and even governments
through threats, intimidation and murder. When the size and power of international
organized crime can endanger the stability of nations, the issues are far from being in the
realm of law enforcement and into the national security ofevery nation on the planet.
Organized crime is not a new phenomenon in Russia or Soviet history. During the
Soviet era, criminal groups and the black market often functioned as an extension of the
Communist party and the KGB. Clearly, the Communist party and KGB used criminal
groups and the black market as a second economy to further their own goals and enrich
their own organizations.
As the role of communist ideology began to wane in the late 1980s, state control
had begun to decline as well. At this time, many ofthese criminal organizations outlived
the state, which fostered them and took on a life of their own. Since the breakup of the
Soviet Union, there has been a dramatic rise in new criminal groups that operate
independently without regard for whatever ground rules for criminal activity that might
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have existed before. The “newMafia,” as it often is referred to, does not abide by the old
customs established by the vory vzakone.
Complicating the problem for Russian law enforcement is the involvement of
former KGB and military officers in organized crime. With their KGB and military
background, special training and contacts with former colleagues, these individuals offer
valuable skills and access that can increase the power and influences ofRussian criminal
groups who tap into them. To generate money, Russian organized crime groups are
actively engaged in the sale ofnarcotics, weapons, antiques, raw materials, stolen vehicles
and some radioactive materials, and the transport of illegal immigrants. They are also
targeting banks, particularly the acquisition ofbanks in order to launder profits as well as
to fraudulently obtain government loans. They also engage in large-scale extortion and
brutally enforce their demands through deadly violence.
In fact, recently, a Member ofParliament was murdered after he publicly exposed a
few organized crime leaders. This was not an isolated incident. Organized crime groups
also have assassinated several city and provincial oiBficials. Although these activities
provide the cash that criminal organizations need to manage and build their empires, their
ability to carry on such transactions is dependent in large part on recruiting corrupt
government officials. The low pay ofpublic officials, the economic hardship they must
endure and the inherent uncertainty ofthe political system appear to have made some of
these individuals quite vulnerable to cooperating with organized crime.
The growing strength and ability ofRussian organized crime is evident. In an
address in February 1994 to the Russian Parliament, President Yeltsin stated organized
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crime is now the number-one problem facing Russia.* In May 1994, in an address to
members of the Russian Federation Counterintelligence Service, President Yeltsin
warned that, ‘The criminalization of society is continuing.”^ The statistics verify his
claim. Of the 2,000 banks in Russia today, amajority are controlled by organized crime,
according to theMinistry of Internal Affairs. To keep this in perspective, many of these
organizations are actually small, local groups ofpetty thieves. They would not fit the
Western definition oforganized crime. However, ofthe 5,700, approximately 200 are
large, sophisticated groups engaged in criminal activity throughout the former Soviet
Union and in 29 other countries, including the United States. The perception of the power
of organized crime among the citizens ofRussia was made clear in a poll in March 1998.
In response to the question “Who controls Russia?” A plurality of23 percent responded
with “the Mafia.” Twenty-two percent responded with, “No one.” 19 percent responded,
‘T don't know,” and just 14 percent responded ‘Tresident Yeltsin.”^
The ramifications of the rapid growth oforganized crime in Russia and elsewhere
in the former Soviet Union are enormous. For Russia itself, there is a real threat that the
surge in crime will turn the Russian people against President Yeltsin's reform program and
drive them into the arms ofRussia's hard-line political forces. Public fear of crime has
been cited as the primary motivation for about three-fourths of those who voted for
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.
The threat oforganized crime to civil society has become so great, in fact, that
President Yeltsin issued a decree giving indiscriminate powers to law enforcement
‘ James R. Woolsey, “Statement of the Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director ofCIA” (paper presented at
the House ofRepresentatives, Washington D.C., 27 June 1994), ERIC, ED 276041.
^Ibid.
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officials to investigate and detain suspected criminals. Even the Russian military has been
authorized to assist in the crackdown effort. The Russian Parliamentarians and other
officials who warn that it contradicts the constitution and violates human rights have
challenged the decree. But this has not stopped the crackdown from going forward. If this
effort is to have any real effect, however, it will have to attack corruption within the
government. Otherwise, it will become simply a crackdown on low-level criminal gangs,
while more sophisticated, better-organized and well-connected criminal groups survive
virtually unharmed.
Substantial corruption within the government, especially within the law
enforcement and security services, would seriously complicate efforts on matters of
interest to the corrupting criminal groups. The impact ofPresident Yeltsin's decreewill
not be known for some time, but the strong influence oforganized crime in all aspects of
social, economic and political life in Russia, as well as many of the former Soviet
republics, suggests a difficult and agonizing future. It is not unreasonable to imagine a
fight between organized crime groups, similar to the ones that occurred in prison that
eliminated many “weaker links” in the criminal organizations. Those groups left could be
very large, sophisticated and influential. And they will pose a long-term threat to Russia
and the rest of the world.
When the security ofweapons ofmass destruction, including nuclear, chemical,
biological and advanced conventional, the stakes can become dangerously high when
Russian criminal organizations have created an extensive infrastructure of international
smuggling networks. This foundation, built on ties to corrupt military, political and law
^Ibid.
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enforcement officials, could be used to simplify the transfer and sale of these weapons and
materials.
In addition, organized crime groups certainly have the resources to bribe or threaten
nuclear weapons handlers or employees at facilities with weapons grade nuclear material.
In many cases, employees at such institutes are poorly paid, or not even paid at all, for
months on end. Yet, despite considerable press speculation to the contrary, trading in
nuclear weapons and materials is not the primary or even secondary business oforganized
crime groups in Russia today. The usual extortion, weapons and narcotics trafficking, and
financial fraud activities currently are too lucrative to be abandoned for the high profile
and risky acquisition weapons ofmass destruction. But one cannot assume that because
this is not yet a favored illegal activity of organized crime that one may ignore it.
Specifically, one cannot rule out the possibility that organized crime groups will be able to
obtain and sell nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials as a target ofopportunity, as
in the nuclear smuggling case in Lithuania. It is especially alarming when hostile states
may try to accelerate or enhance their own weapons development programs by attempting
to acquire weapons ofmass destruction or weapons grade material through organized
crime groups.
Though organized crime groups appear to be the logical brokers or purveyors of
nuclear weapons and materials, individual criminal acts in this field also must be
considered. Indeed, most ofthe cases ofnuclear-related smuggling we are aware of
involve desperate individuals or small groups, with no apparent links to organized crime,
simply trying to make fast money. A disgruntled military officer where a nuclear weapon
is stored or an employee at a research institute with access to weapons grade-nuclear
materials is also in a position to steal and pass on the deadly contraband.
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The Russian government has made it clear they want to prevent the proliferation of
all weapons ofmass destruction and materials. President Yeltsin has said that, “The
proliferation ofnuclear and other categories ofweapons ofmass destruction within the
country and beyond cannot be allowed.”^ To date, there have not been any nuclear
warheads or significant quantities ofweapons-grade materials being smuggled out of the
former Soviet Union. There are, however, numerous cases in which low-enriched
uranium, medical and other radioactive isotopes, and fraudulent materials, notably red
mercury and osmium, have been offered for sale on the black market. Nonetheless these
stories caimot be taken lightly even though the transactions in low-grade nuclear materials
and radioactive isotopes do not pose a proliferation threat per se because they cannot be
used to make nuclear weapons. However, some ofthese materials and isotopes could be a
terrorist tool ifcombined with a conventional bomb to produce low level, but still lethal,
radioactive contamination.
In essence, the possibility of organized crime groups gaining access to nuclear
weapons and materials has profound national security implications for the United States.
The inherent difficulties ofdealing with crime affects the security ofevery nation on Earth
whose interests are compounded in Russia, a country that is still undergoing a radical
transformation as it comes to grips with the astonishing problems left in the wake of
communism.
How Serious a Threat is Organized Crime?
Russia is presently struggling through one ofthe great transformations of the 20*
century. Yet the dramatic changes occurring in Russia are even more daunting because it
“Ibid
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is uncertain where they will lead. Some point to the demise ofother great European
empires such as the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman, whose residual conflicts still
plague the international arena. But the collapse and breakup of the Soviet Union was
more than the end ofan empire. It was also the collapse ofan idea, Soviet communism.
Russians now must cope with more than the end ofan empire; they also must free
themselves from the political and economic after-effects of the failed philosophy. At one
end ofthe spectrum are theorists who consider the Russian Mafia as a dangerous
successor of the former ColdWar rivalry. Followers of this beliefprovide a worst-case
scenario of the threat oforganized crime in Russia. The opposite end of the spectrum are
those who argue that the threat ofRussian organized crime is not only exaggerated, but
also in the present circumstances, has certain positive functions in Russian society.
Adherents to this belief contend that the Russian Mafia has received notoriety
merely due to the economic and political conditions that exist in Russia.^ Moreover, the
overall tone ofthis paper points to the overwhelming accuracy of the worst-case scenario.
The best-case approach is less compelling but, because of its more analytical approach,
highlights the need to go beyond the obvious assertions and engage in a more rigorous
analysis. Though accepting the best-case analysis that organized crime has certain
benefits in contemporary Russia, the inquiry suggests the costs and negative consequences
outweigh these.
The next part ofthe analysis attempts to solidify the key elements in the position
articulated by the best and worst-case advocates. In the worst-case assessment, Claire
Sterling has noted the Russian Mafia is superior to all other organized crime groups.
* PhilWilliams, “Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime,” in Russian Organized
Crime: A New Threat, ed. Phil Williams (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 1.
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According to Sterling they are more ruthless, more skillful and more successful than the
other organizations. In addition to the KGB influence this is attributed to the experience
of the criminals in circumventing a totalitarian political system. As Sterling once again
observed;
... the Russian Mafia is a union ofracketeers without equal. Unlike
the Mafia in Sicily, which it admires and copies as a standard of
excellence, it has no home seat or central command. There are no
ancestral memories or common bloodlines. Nevertheless, its
proliferating clans are invading every sphere of life, usurping political
power, taking over state enterprises and fleecing natural resources.
They are engaged in extortion, theft, forgery, armed assault, contract
killing, swindling arms running, arms dealing, prostitution, gambling,
loan sharking, embezzling, money laundering and black marketing - all
on a monumental and increasingly global scale. ^
Another component of the worst-case scenario analysis is the emphasis placed on
the association between Russian organized crime and nuclear material trafficking. It is
sometimes implied and sometimes stated outright that the Russian Mafia is selling nuclear
materials, and that the Mafia may have developed an alliance with a number ofnations
who wish to develop these capabilities. This debate is often coupled with familiar cold
war-era paradigms relating to the nuclear danger of the new “red Mafia.”
However, there are also political consequences that the adherents of the worst-case
assessment follow. The disintegration of the old Communist state will continue, but
neither reformers nor their opponents will be capable ofdevising a new system. In this
scenario, the government will continue to pass laws that are not followed. In this absence
of a rule of law, individuals and groups are forced to relate to one another through power
relations.
* Claire Sterling, “Redfellas,” NewRepublic, 11 April 1994,112.
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In this event, crimewill become even more rampant. The businesseswill either
leave, decide not to invest in Russia or they will be forced to join partnerships with
questionable protection societies. The military, which is already split, may lose its
remaining cohesion and fragment into a modem version of a private army. Nuclear
weapons, or plutonium, would become an actively traded resource on the black market.
The further breakdown of the state and society also could lead to traritorial fragmentation.
Various regions ofRussia may decide they would be better offon their own and assert
their independence as Chechnya did.
A scenario ofgeneral anarchy would be highly threatening to neighboring nations
and the United States. The dangers from nuclear weapons and the proliferation ofother
weapons are obvious. In addition, internal conflicts, or economic and ecological disasters
resulting from nuclear proliferation, could trigger immensely dismptive migrations out of
the former Soviet Union. Weakness might tempt neighbors to take over territories in
Russia’s time ofweakness.
Though all the elements ofthe above scenario are not likely, they cannot be
completely discarded. The continuing chaos, the absence oforder and the threats to the
cohesion ofRussia itselfcould motivate Russians to demand a more authoritarian
leadership. Such an authoritarian political systemmight be used to continue the
implementation ofmarket reforms. It might be used to try to return Russia back into a
centrally controlled government. An authoritarian nationalist leader might seek to build
and expand power at the expense of its neighbors. One can not forget the origins ofHitler
and Mussolini was in times of severe economic stress and national embarrassment.
Nevertheless, efforts by individuals to decentralize authority do face obstacles.
Even the conflict in Chechnya demonstrates how difficult it is to impose the will of
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Moscow over independent groups and territories. No one trusts the political leadership in
Russia. Government only seems able to reassert itself through the imposition ofpower,
perhaps assisted by weakness that stems from local insurrections. Consistent with this
lack of legitimate authority, it is likely that various institutions ofstate control will seek to
extend their reach gradually. They will increase their assets through crime and corruption.
With these assets the various branches ofthe governmentwill attempt to only help leaders
who can provide favors. Under this form ofgovernance the political elite will fashion a
government to solely benefit its own and to maintain opportunistic influence for their
members.
It is not only argued that Russian organized crime could derail the process of
democratization and create such a backlash that ultra-nationalists who want to impose
some kind ofauthoritarian rule are likely to come to power. It is even suggested the
Russian state itself could fall under the control of the Mafia. Just as the Mafia presently
influences the presidency, it can support its own leader for the job. Indeed, in some
variants of the worst-case analysis, many believe the struggle has already been lost and
Russia has already become a criminal superpower.
Though not all those who adhere to the worst-case scenario would necessarily
accept every detail of the above-stated arguments, there is certainly a consensus on the
seriousness of the threat both domestically and internationally. At the other end ofthe
spectrum are those who, in essence, deny that Russian organized crime is a real threat to
national security. In this view, held mostly by criminologists and economists, organized
crime is far from the negative phenomenon portrayed in the worst-case assessment.^
’Ibid
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In some respects the best-case analysis is more difficult to conceive than the worst-
case analysis. Part ofthe reason is that those who have made this assessment do it in a
more analytical manner than the adherents of the worst-case scenario. Nonetheless, there
are major themes central to the best-case scenario. The first is that organized crime
fulfills certain positive functions in the Russian economic and social life. In particular, it
is asserted that organized crime has become a substitute for the government, particularly
in the matter ofcontract law. Jim Leitzel, for instance, a specialist on Russian economic
reform, has argued that the main problem in Russia is that democracy is still
unconsolidated, with the continued absence of contract law, and continued government
monopolies.* The first ofthese is particularly important because the state is unable to
enforce private contracts and business people must look elsewhere. Organized crime can
provide the security that business people need to enter into deals in the first place.^ In
other words, organized crime offers the protection and contract enforcement not provided
by the state but crucial to the functioning ofa capitalist system. The implication of this is
that rather than organized crime infiltrating business, businesseswill seek out organized
crime to fulfill the needed fimctions ofcontract enforcement.
This argument is given credence when one compares this argument to theMafia in
Sicily, which grew up in response to a weak and ineffective state to enforce contracts and
property rights. Organized crime, thus, is providing a necessary function crucial to the
functioning of a market economy where there is a lack of regulation and enforcement.
Moreover, recently it seems to do so in response to requests for assistance. Business in
® Jim Leitzel, Russian EconomicReform (London: Routledge, 1995), 43.
®lbid.
80
Russia has demanded protection that the state has been unable to meet and that organized
crime is meeting instead.
The second component of the best-case scenario is that organized crime is simply
the ultimate form ofcapitalism, a form unregulated by either law or morality and therefore
particularly efficient at capital accumulation.^® In this view, criminal groups are among
the most progressive forces in Russia since they are among the strongest supporters and
greatest beneficiaries of the privatization process. Furthermore, as the profits from
organized crime are reinvested in the legitimate economy, they will provide a considerable
boost to the development of capitalism.^* This theory maintains that at a time when the
market remains imperfect and there is a lack ofclarity about what kind ofbehavior is
permitted and what is prohibited, entrepreneurial activity, to be effective, has to be
ruthless. In this environment, it is not unusual that entrepreneurship and criminal activity
are closely associated.
The final component ofthe best-case assessment is that the situation is likely to
improve since organized crime is an unavoidable consequence of transient economies.
They explain that as the conditions change, organized crimewill become progressively
weaker.*^ This argument is primarily articulated by Leitzel, who argues that although the
Mafia fulfills several positive and necessary functions in the economies of states in
transition, its sphere of influence is likely to lessen as reform proceeds.*^ As the state
gradually fills the role currently occupied by the Mafia, then the opportunities available to
Williams, “Introduction,” 6.
” Ibid., 7.
Leitzel, Russian EconomicReform, 45.
13 Ibid.
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criminal syndicates will likewise diminish. And as the opportunities for organized crime
shrink, so will its power. The activities of theMafia eventually will be assimilated into
the legitimate economy.
Neither of these views is without flaw ormerit. The major problem with the worst-
case assessment is that it tends to rest on the recurrent cold war theme of “us verses
them” and oversimplifies the argument. The problem ofthe best-case assessment is that
the focus primarily on the economic aspects oforganized crime ignores the potential for
its consolidation, similar to La CosaNostra in the United States and Italy. It likewise
ignores the potential for the development of symbiotic links with political and economic
elite’s, and the capacity oforganized crime to perpetuate the conditions that initially gave
rise to it and allow it to flourish.*’ The best case is too optimistic, with an over-emphasis
on the positive contribution ofRussian organized crime and not enough attention to its
negative affects.
Organized crime is not something that is easily eradicated. Nor are the problems
only economic. To argue that organized crime is somehow a positive force in nations
encountering a political transition is to ignore its impact on not only social and economic
life but also political power. In nations in transition, organized crime promotes the
consolidation of the position ofelite’s based not on the support ofthe public but on the
power to coerce and intimidate. The symbols ofwealth and power displayed by organized
crime will prove very attractive and lead to more people becoming corrupt. Recruitment
is easy because illegal means ofadvancement possess far greater and more immediate




worse. Therefore, the authoritarianism ofcommunism has been replaced by the
authoritarianism of the Mafia in Russia.
One possible response to this, of course, related to the best- case scenario, is that the
criminal market will be irresistible and there will be a gradual legitimization ofcriminal
leaders. Although the first generation ofcapitalists are more concerned with capital
accumulation than with the means ofachieving it, they will want their children to be
legitimate, with the result ofa gradual transition from illicit to licit business. Support for
this assumption can be found in the United States where the traditional Mafia has declined
in importance as ethnic groups assimilated. Such process could be aided by the
development ofeffective rules and regulations to govern the economy. The theory here is
that unregulated capitalism in which illicit business looms largest will give way to a more
regulated form of capitalism that is dominated by legitimate businesses.*®
The alternate model of the Russian future, the one in which the author adheres to, is
organized crime could become the dominant force in Russian society. Once these
organizations have consolidated their position within the society then it is very difficult to
remove them, especially when cooperative relationships have been established with the
political and economic hierarchy. In the Soviet Union there was a cooperative
relationship between the black marketers and the nomenklatura, but it was a union that
was dominated by the state, which was according to Rawlinson an active assimilative
state. The danger for Russia presently is that the criminals and not the state are
progressively dominating this relationship. Ironically, the prognosis here is the exact
opposite of the outline presented in the previous paragraph: instead of the legitimatization
ofcriminal capitalism and criminal organizations by the illegal economy, the process
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moved in the opposite direction, with corruption becoming a pervasive problem leading
ultimately to a collusive relationship between the Russian nation and Russian organized
crime. As foreboding as this prognosis may be, it is much more compelling than the
argument that organized crime will simply decline or disappear on its own.
The battle against international organized crime will not be like wars we have
fought against nations. The adversaries in this struggle are criminal enterprises that wear
no uniforms and have no patriotic ideals. They feed offofsocieties' weaknesses,
corrupting the normal course of life and destroying civic culture. Their quest for profit
mocks all laws, mores and values. They erode what hope is left in nations newly emerged
fi-om totalitarianism that are desperately struggling toward stability, democracy and a
better life.
In what threatens to follow the cold war, one may, sadly, come to call it the era of
the proliferation ofanarchy; the danger ofbreakdown of legitimate authorities in many
nations becomes even more alarming. The specter of these weapons in the hands of
criminal groups with the capability ofpassing them on to hostile powers compels the
international community to ending the pervasiveness ofcrime in Russia.
Ibid., 26.
GLOSSARY
Avtoritet - Authority; the new crime bosses who had less regard for the antiquated rules of
the vary v zakone.
Dacha - An opulent country retreat that was allegedly paid for with funds from the state
and was illegally built by solders in return for an early release from their military service.
Demokratizatsiia - Democratization
Fenia - Criminal jargon
FSK - The successor to the domestic KGB
Glasnost - Openness
Kripha - Its literal translation is “rooC’ the slang term for protection payments paid to the
Russian Mafia.
Morozhenoye - Ice cream
Nalevo - slang term meaning “everything to the left.” Explaining how the black market
helped to supply the shortage ofconsumer goods in the Soviet Union.
Nomenklatura - Bureaucrats who have remained in the government since the fall of
Communism and have been accused of stifling democratic reforms.
Perstroika - Restructuring
Skhodka - A meeting required by they code ofthe vory v zakone to settle disputes.
Speculyantz - Black marketers
Suchya’voina - The “Scab’s War” that was a fight to the death in the gulags between the
vory who decided not to go to war for the state.
Suki - A slang term whose less offensive meaning is “scabs.” These were the vory v
zakone who violated the criminal code and opted to go to war in exchange for lessened
prison sentences, they were greeted by brutality and insults from their former colleagues.




Tsekhoviki - Owners ofunderground factories
Urki - Alternative leaders of the political criminals who were placed in this position after a
leadership crisis in the 1920s and 1930s.
Vory or Vor - The singular term for an individual who is the highest-ranking criminal in
the RussianMafia.
Vory V Zakone - The literal translation is “thieves professing the code” are believed to
occupy the highest level ofthe criminal Mafia when the \or is in prison, he/she is the
master oftheir environment, and in fi-eedom, influences hundreds ofcriminal gangs over
many nations.
Zhigani - Leaders ofthe political criminals, they borrowed many of the traditions of the
vory V zakone and altered them to fit the ideological undertones that were unique to the
political criminals.
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